Confederate War Papers: 
Fairfax Court House, New Orleans, Seven Pines, Richmond & NC

By Gustavus Woodson Smith, CSA General, 1822 – 1896
Published in 1884



PART III. NOTES ON THE BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES OR FAIR OAKS.


CHAPTER I.

Preliminary movements: Report that McDowell was advancing on the 27th—General Johnston orders preparations to attack the Federal right on the north bank of the Chickahominy—McDowell's forces turn back—General Johnston reverts to his first intention to attack the Federal left on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy—letter from General Johnston to General Whiting.

Preliminary.—In withdrawing from the Peninsula, formed by the James and York rivers, the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston, moved upon two lines from Williamsburg to Richmond. The divisions of D. H. Hill and Longstreet on the Charles City Road—both under General Longstreet—crossed the Chickahominy River at Long Bridge. G. W. Smith's division, the two divisions which formed Magruder's command, the main body of the cavalry, and the reserve artillery—all under General G. W. Smith—followed the Old Stage road through New Kent Court-house, and crossed the Chickaominy at Bottom's Bridge. The Federal Army of the Potomac, commanded by General George B. McClellan, advanced by the road upon which the forces under General G. W. Smith retired.


The following note from General Longstreet is illustrative of the time:

“Headquarters, Second Corps, “Palo Alto, May 8th, 1862.

“My dear General:

“Yours of this morning is received. If your road can beat this for mud I don't want to see it. I will stop near Forge Bridge to-night—headquarters three wall tents. My men have their bellies full, also their cartridge boxes; so I don't fear McClellan or any one in Yankeedom. If you see the General say to him that we are as happy as larks over here till we get 126 wagons (the total number) up to the hub at one time. Anything less we can endure with composure. Write often.

“With respect, “J. Longstreet, Maj.-Gen'l Comdg.

“General G. W. Smith, Comdg. First Corps.”

After General Johnston's army crossed the Chickahominy Magruder's troops were placed in position to guard the passage of the bridges and fords of that river from the Mechanicsville Bridge* to New Bridge, and extended from the latter point along the New Bridge road across the Nine Miles road to the Richmond and York River Railroad. G. W. Smith's division was on the Williamsburg or Old Stage road two or three miles from the city, with one brigade in observation near Bottom's Bridge. The two divisions under General Longstreet took position south of the Williamsburg road three or four miles from Richmond.

On the 23d of May Brigadier-General Hatton reported from a point on the Williamsburg Road nine and a half 

* See Map of the vicinity of Richmond.
miles east of Richmond that the enemy had moved out from their position this side of Bottom's Bridge, and was in his immediate front with infantry, artillery, and cavalry. The next day he wrote as follows:

“Junction* of 7 and 9 Miles Roads, “7 p.m., May 24th, 1862.

“General Smith:

‘I will retire my command to-night to a point, on the 7 miles road,† one and a half miles from this. The enemy are in considerable force in my immediate front. In my skirmish to-day I lost but three men.

“R. hatton, Brig.-Genl.”

The same night General Stuart reported to General Smith that the Meadow Bridges were in the hands of the enemy—that General Semmes had, during the day, repulsed a party attempting to cross at New Bridge— and that, later, the enemy's pickets crossed above and slipped through the swamps and occupied this side of that bridge. At the same time General Cobb reported to General Smith, through General McLaws, that a crossing was being established by the enemy about half a mile below Mechanicsville Bridge.

On the 27th General McLaws reported the enemy's skirmishers pressing ours in front of Semmes's and Griffith's brigades, just east of the New Bridge fork of the Nine Miles road.

About 1 o'clock, p.m., on the 27th General Smith received the following note from General Johnston:

“We must get ready to fight. Anderson reports (Junction, 11 a.m.) that his videttes have informed him 

* This junction is called “Seven Pines.”

† Williamsburg old Stage road.


that McDowell is advancing ‘in force’—his pickets at Guinea's. The Army reported six miles this side of Fredericksburg. His main force at Half Sink—three regiments under Hamilton at the junction. We must get ready for this.”

Up to this time General Johnston's intention had been to strike an effective blow upon the enemy, approaching by the Williamsburg road, as soon as they came near enough, in force, to enable him to engage the larger part of his army in the direction of Seven Pines without exposing Richmond too much to an attack coming from the north bank of the Chickahominy. He knew that a large portion of two corps of McClellan's army were in the vicinity of Bottom's Bridge and at a point near Seven Pines—and considered them still too far off—but was expecting them to come nearer—and had held his army ready to strike in that direction at the shortest notice.

On the receipt of General Johnston's note stating that McDowell was moving to form a junction with McClellan, General Smith proceeded at once to the headquarters of the Army, and it was there soon arranged that he should go in person to the left—that A. P. Hill, whose division was then near Ashland, should be ordered up—that Smith's Division, under Whiting, should move to the vicinity of Meadow Bridges, and that General Smith should be relieved of the duty of commanding General Magruder, who would report direct to General Johnston. But, D. R. Jones’ division, which was on the left, should be, for the time, placed under General Smith's orders. In the new arrangement the divisions of A. P. Hill, D. R. Jones, and Smith's division, under General Whiting, would constitute the left wing of the Army.

General Smith was directed by General Johnston to make every preparation to attack the right of the enemy 
on the north bank of the Chickahominy, with these three divisions, as soon as practicable. A little before sunset, on the 28th, he returned to General Johnston's headquarters and informed him that A. P. Hill's division would be in the immediate presence of the enemy at Mechanicsville before midnight; and would assault that position at the dawn of day. This would clear the way for Smith's division, under Whiting, and D. R. Jones’ division, to cross the river at Meadow Bridges and the Mechanicsville Bridge. After carrying the works at Mechanicsville, A. P. Hill was ordered to press on to Beaver Dam Creek, to which point he would be quickly followed by the other two divisions, and the three would make a combined assault on the enemy's line along the eastern crest of that creek. This position had been closely examined by the Chief Engineer of the Army, and by General Smith's chief of staff, whilst General Johnston's Army was awaiting the enemy between the Pamunky and Chickahominy rivers. They had reported it to be very strong—in natural features of the ground—especially against an attack coming from the direction of Mechanicsville; and that it could not be turned from that side, without making a wide detour which would consume a good deal of time. General Smith distinctly advised that the direct attack should be made, as there was no time to lose if we expected to beat the enemy before McDowell's forces formed a junction with those of McClellan. Every confidence was felt that A. P. Hill would take the works at Mechanicsville with certainty and without delay—and it was believed that the three divisions could carry the lines at Beaver Dam Creek; but, it would be bloody work. More than justified, however, because of the necessity for accomplishing decisive results before the arrival of McDowell.

When General Johnston informed the officers present that McDowell's forces had returned to Fredericksburg, and it was believed they were moving further north, General Smith advised that the attack, he had just previously urged, should not be made; at least, until it was known that McDowell was moving to join McClellan—and stated that, until this fact was known there was no occasion to cross the Chickahominy, all of the bridges and fords of which stream were held by the enemy, in order to attack three corps on the north side—having a strong position like that of Beaver Dam Creek—when two corps were on our side of the river, almost within reach, where there were no such strong natural features of the ground against us.

General Longstreet thought the attack ought to be made as contemplated before it was known that McDowell had gone back to Fredericksburg. General Johnston decided that this was inexpedient: and he directed General Smith to order A. P. Hill to withdraw from his position—in contact with the enemy at Mechanicsville—before daylight, and take position on the extreme left of the army on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy. General Longstreet then urged that an attack be made, next morning, against the enemy on our side of the river, in the direction of Seven Pines. General Johnston said that so soon as it should become certainly known that McDowell was not coming, he would revert to his former intention, to strike an effective blow on the enemy approaching by the Williamsburg road, when a respectable force, worth crushing, came within easy and safe reach—and stated that the disposition of our forces, made whilst it was supposed McDowell was on the way to join McClellan, was too strong on the extreme left to warrant an attack toward Seven Pines next morning— 
and that Huger's division was expected to arrive very soon. For these reasons it was not deemed expedient to adopt Longstreet's suggestion that an attack be made in the direction of Seven Pines on the morning of May 29th.

Before midnight General Smith sent several different messengers to A. P. Hill directing him to withdraw before daylight: only one of whom reached him. Apprehending that none of the messengers would succeed in finding their way through the intricate swamps of that locality in time to countermand the order for Hill's attack—General Smith informed General Johnston that, in case the change of order did not reach General Hill—and the latter should become involved with superior forces on the north bank of the river—he (General Smith) would feel bound to take the other two divisions over the river to Hill's assistance; and asked that in this case General Johnston would hold the rest of the army in readiness for whatever action might be necessary. General Johnston acquiesced in this, and at midnight General Smith proceeded to the vicinity of the Meadow Bridges. In the morning there was a dense fog. Before it lifted, about eight o'clock A.M., General Smith learned that A. P. Hill's division had been withdrawn, without its presence having been suspected by the enemy, and Hill was moving quietly to take the position assigned him on the Richmond side of the river. General Smith then proceeded to the extreme left to confer with General Hill and General J. E. B. Stuart.

Whilst with General Hill, General Smith received the following letter transmitted to him by General Whiting, to whom it was addressed by General Johnston:


“Headquarters, Harrison's, May 29, 1862.

“My Dear General:

I have just received the note you wrote in regard to your camp. I will give precise orders not to let it be interfered with. I received a message from Huger to the effect that his troops had not arrived at 6.30 this morning—no cars having been sent for them. The Quartermaster who had charge of the matter reported to me at sunset that the trains were ready and would be off at 9 o'clock. Lee ordered John G. Walker's brigade to Petersburg and Holmes ordered it back. For any purpose but that contemplated yesterday the present disposition of our troops is not good, too strong on the extreme left. If nothing is heard of McDowell we must bring you back to a more central place. D. H. Hill reported an hour ago that one of his advanced brigadiers had sent forward two hundred skirmishers who very soon met a brigade of the enemy with cavalry and artillery. Who knows but that in the course of the morning Longstreet's scheme may accomplish itself. If we get into a fight here you'll have to hurry to help us. I think it will be best for A. P. Hill's troops to watch the bridges and for yours to be well in this direction ready to act anywhere. Tell G. W.

“Yours truly, J. E. Johnston.

“Brigadier-General Whiting.”

On the same day at 4.30 P.M. General J. E. B. Stuart, commander of the cavalry, reported to General G. W. Smith — “Before I could get to Ashland the enemy with infantry and cavalry returned and now hold it, doubtless with the view of removing the stores there. No advance here. Some sharp shooting on Telegraph Road.”

General Johnston's letter of the 29th, to General Whiting, required new arrangements of the troops to be made. On the 30th A. P. Hill was brought nearer to the Meadow Bridges, and Whiting (commanding G. W. Smith's division) was directed to take ground nearer Richmond in position to move towards Seven Pines, if General Johnston determined to strike in that direction, or on Mechanicsville in case it should be found that McDowell, after all, was really coming to join McClellan.

It will thus be seen that the movement of McDowell, reported to General Johnston in the afternoon of the 27th, had resulted in removing General Smith from the Williamsburg Road, where his division had been watching the advance of the enemy on that side, and placing him in command of the left wing of the Army; whilst General Longstreet became the Senior Officer of all the troops on the right.


CHAPTER II.

Ex-President Davis's account of preliminary operations around Richmond—Tells General Lee why and how he was dissatisfied—General Johnston's reported proposed plan—President rides out to see the action commence—account of that ride—Author's comments.

Mr. Davis says: * “Our army having retreated from the Peninsula and withdrawn from the north side of the Chickahominy to the immediate vicinity of Richmond, 

* Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Vol. II. p. 119.


I rode out occasionally to the lines and visited the headquarters of the commanding General. There were no visible preparations for defence, and my brief conversations with the General afforded no satisfactory information as to his plans and purposes. We had, under the supervision of General Lee, perfected as far as we could the detached works before the city, but these were rather designed to protect it against a sudden attack than to resist approaches by a great army. They were, also, so near to the city that it might have been effectually bombarded by guns exterior to them. Anxious for the defence of the ancient capital of Virginia, now the capital of the Confederate States, and remembering a remark of General Johnston, that the Spaniards were the only people who now undertook to hold fortified towns, I had written to him that he knew the defence of Richmond must be made at a distance from it. Seeing no preparation to keep the enemy at a distance, and kept in ignorance of any plan for such purpose, I sent for General R. E. Lee, then at Richmond, in general charge of army operations, and told him why and how I was dissatisfied with the condition of affairs. He asked me what I thought it was proper to do. Recurring to a conversation held about the time we had together visited General Johnston, I answered that McClellan should be attacked on the other side of the Chickahominy before he matured his preparations for a siege of Richmond. To this he promptly assented, as I anticipated he would, for I knew it had been his own opinion. He then said: ‘General Johnston should of course advise you of what he expects or proposes to do. Let me go and see him, and defer this discussion until I return.’ When General Lee came back, he told me that General Johnston proposed, on the next Thursday, to 
move against the enemy as follows. General A. P. Hill was to move down on the right flank and rear of the enemy. General G. W. Smith, as soon as Hill's guns opened, was to cross the Chickahominy at the Meadow Bridge, attack the enemy in flank, and by the conjunction of the two it was expected to double him up. Then Longstreet was to cross on the Mechanicsville Bridge and attack him in front. From this plan the best results were hoped by both of us. On the morning of the day proposed I hastily dispatched my office business, and rode out toward the Meadow Bridge to see the action commence. On the road I found Smith's division halted, and the men dispersed in the woods. Looking for some one from whom I could get information, I finally saw General Hood, and asked him the meaning of what I saw. He told me he did not know anything more than that they had been halted. I asked him where General Smith was; he said he believed he had gone to a farm house in the rear, adding that he thought he was ill. Riding on to the bluff which overlooks the Meadow Bridge, I asked Colonel Anderson, posted there in observation, whether he had seen anything of the enemy in his front. He said that he had seen only two mounted men across the bridge, and a small party of infantry on the other side of the river, some distance below, both of whom, he said, he could show me if I would go with him into the garden back of the house. There, by the use of a powerful glass, were distinctly visible two cavalry videttes at the farther end of the bridge, and a squad of infantry lower down the river, who had covered themselves with a screen of green boughs. The Colonel informed me that he had not heard Hill's guns; it was, therefore, supposed he had not advanced. I then rode down the bank of the river, 
followed by a cavalcade of sight-seers, who, I suppose, had been attracted by the expectation of a battle. The little squad of infantry, about fifteen in number, as we approached, fled over the ridge, and were lost to sight. Near to the Mechanicsville Bridge I found General Howell Cobb, commanding the support of a battery of artillery. He pointed out to me on the opposite side of the river the only enemy he had seen, and which was evidently a light battery. Riding on to the main road, which led to the Mechanicsville Bridge, I found General Longstreet, walking to and fro in an impatient, it might be said fretful, manner. Before speaking to him, he said his division had been under arms all day waiting for orders to advance, and that the day was now so far spent that he did not know what was the matter. I afterward learned from General Smith that he had received information from a citizen that the Beaver-dam Creek presented an impassable barrier, and that he had thus fortunately been saved from a disaster. Thus ended the offensive defensive programme from which Lee expected much, and of which I was hopeful.”

Comments.—General Smith has no recollection of ever having spoken to President Davis in reference to the position of the Federals at Beaverdam Creek; he certainly never said anything to any one which could justify Mr. Davis in making the statement, just quoted, in regard to that subject. General Smith's information on that matter was derived from his Chief of Staff and from the Chief Engineer of the Army, both of whom had closely examined the ground in question. In speaking of Beaverdam Creek in another connection Mr. Davis says, on page 134, volume ii., “Rise and Fall of the Confederate States Government:” “This position was naturally strong, the banks of the Creek in front being high 
and almost perpendicular, and the approach to it was over open fields commanded by the fire of artillery and infantry under cover on the opposite side.”

It should be borne in mind that the front of the Federal main line on the north bank of the Chickahominy was nearly parallel to that stream, its right being thrown back along the eastern crest of Beaverdam Creek, almost at right angles to the main line. At Mechanicsville, about a mile west of Beaverdam Creek, the Federals had an intrenched outpost, with videttes at the Meadow Bridges. When it was believed that McDowell was moving to form a junction with McClellan, General G. W. Smith advised that A. P. Hill's division should carry the Federal outpost at Mechanicsville at daylight on the 29th and push on against the right of their main line. In the attack upon the enemy's position at Beaverdam Creek, A. P. Hill's division was to be closely supported by D. R. Jones's division and G. W. Smith's division, under Whiting. It was believed that these three divisions could carry the right of the Federal line by direct assault. But Mr. Davis says: “General A. P. Hill was to move down on the right flank and rear of the enemy. General G. W. Smith, as soon as Hill's guns opened, was to cross the Chickahominy at the Meadow Bridge, attack the enemy in flank, and by the conjunction of the two it was expected to double him up. Then Longstreet was to cross on the Mechanicsville Bridge and attack him in front. From this plan the best results were hoped.”

It has already been stated that the right of the Federal main line, in position along the eastern crest of Beaverdam Creek, could not be turned without making a long detour to the north. Mr. Davis does not explain how A. P. Hill and G. W. Smith were to attack the 

enemy in rear and flank and double him up; whilst Longstreet would cross on the Mechanicsville Bridge—a mile west of the right of the enemy's main line—and attack him in front. But, he says that from this alleged plan the best results were hoped by both General Lee and himself.

It should be remembered that the order to attack on the morning of the 29th was countermanded by General Johnston on the night of the 28th; and that whilst President Davis was riding out on the 29th “to see the action commence,” General Johnston had written to General Whiting, then commanding Smith's division, saying: “For any purpose but that contemplated yesterday the present disposition of our troops is not good—too strong on the extreme left. If nothing is heard of McDowell we must bring you back to a more central place. . . . If we get into a fight here you'll have to hurry to help us. I think it will be best for A. P. Hill's troops to watch the bridges—and for yours to be well in this direction, ready to act anywhere. Tell G. W.”

The letter from which the foregoing quotation is made was received by General Whiting and by him transmitted to General Smith—on the extreme left of the army—whilst President Davis having “hastily dispatched his office business,” was riding out toward the Meadow Bridge “to see the action commence;” was catechising General Hood; looking through a powerful glass at two of the enemy's videttes; riding down the bank of the river, followed by a cavalcade of sightseers; frightening a little squad of infantry, about fifteen in number; conversing with General Cobb about the only enemy he had seen; and finding General Longstreet, who told him “the day was now so far spent that he did not know what was the matter.” Such is the account 

Mr. Davis now gives of “the offensive defensive programme,” from which he says he was hopeful and Lee expected much.

Without further allusion to General Johnston's contemplated attack upon the right of the Federal army in the direction of Mechanicsville on the 29th, attention will now be called to the battle of the 31st of May.


CHAPTER III.

Description of the battle-ground of Seven Pines—Position and number of Confederates—of Federals—General Johnston's plan and intentions—documentary proof.

The point known as Seven Pines is merely the junction of two roads. It is on the Williamsburg, or old stage road, seven miles east of Richmond. From the north-east suburb of Richmond another road, lying between the Williamsburg road and the Chickahominy, leads to Seven Pines. This is called the Nine Miles road, and the distance from Richmond to Seven Pines by this road is nine miles; it crosses the Richmond and York River Railroad, at Fair Oaks station, a little less than one mile from Seven Pines. At a point on the Nine Miles road, about six and a half miles from Richmond, a road turns off north and leads across the Chickahominy at New Bridge. The Charles City road branches off from the Williamsburg road at a point some four miles west of Seven Pines; lateral roads lead from it into the Williamsburg road. The country about Seven Pines is mostly flat, farm land, quite heavily wooded and swampy. In rainy weather it is very boggy and difficult of passage, even in the beaten tracks. Besides 
the main roads already mentioned, the country is intersected by farm and wood roads.

Position and Number of the Confederate Forces.—At night, on the 30th of May, the right wing of General Johnston's army was east of the city. This wing, 30,000 strong, was commanded by General Longstreet. It was composed of three divisions—Longstreet's 14,000, six brigades, on and near the Nine Miles road, three brigades in the vicinity of Richmond, and the other three brigades three and a half miles from the city. D. H. Hill's, 11,000, on the Williamsburg road, about two and a half miles from Richmond, and Huger's, 5000 strong, near Hill. The centre of the army, commanded by General Magruder, consisted, at this time, of McLaws's division, 11,000 strong—it was guarding the Chickahominy from the Mechanicsville road to New Bridge, and thence along the New Bridge road across the Nine Miles road. The left wing of the army, 19,500 strong, commanded by General G. W. Smith, was composed, at this time, of three divisions—D. R. Jones's, 5,000, on the crest of the Chickahominy Bluff, guarding the Mechanicsville and Meadow Bridges roads—A. P. Hill's, 4000 strong, guarding the crossings of the Chickahominy on the extreme left—and Smith's division, under General Whiting, 10,500 strong, on the Meadow Bridges road, a little in rear of the troops that held the crest of the Chickahominy Bluff at that point. There were 1300 cavalry under General J. E. B. Stuart, and 900 reserve artillery under Colonel Pendleton. The total strength of the Confederate army was a little more than 62,000.*

Position and Number of the Federal Forces.—The 

* These figures, in round numbers, are from Colonel Taylor's “Four Years with General Lee.”


following summary is taken from an account of the “Battle of Fair Oaks,” given by General George W. Mindil. At night, on the 30th of May, there were two corps of General McClellan's army on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy, and three corps on the north bank of that stream. The latter extended from near the Railroad Bridge to Mechanicsville. Of the two corps on the Richmond side, “The Fourth,” 12,000 effectives, was commanded by General Keyes—it was composed of two divisions—Casey's, 5000, had its left on the Williamsburg road half a mile west of Seven Pines, its right near the Richmond and York River Railroad, two or three hundred yards in advance of Fair Oaks station; Couch's division, 7000, was in line along the Nine Miles road, its left at Seven Pines, its right a little beyond the railroad near Fair Oaks station, with an intrenched picket across the Nine Miles road, about one mile in advance of Fair Oaks. The front of each of these divisions was protected by lines of riflepits, strengthened by abattis. On the left of Casey's line there was a small, unfinished, pentangular redoubt. The flanks of both divisions were “in the air.” About one third of a mile in front of Keyes's main force there was a line of pickets from the White Oak Swamp to the Chickahominy.

The third corps, 13,000, commanded by General Heintzelman, was composed of two divisions—Kearney's, 6500, at Bottom's Bridge, was ordered at 4 P.M. on the 30th to prepare to march early next morning to the support of Keyes's corps, and Hooker's division, 6500, at the White Oak Bridge, was instructed to get ready, and—after leaving a sufficient guard of artillery and infantry at the bridge crossings, to follow Kearney at the earliest practicable moment. The two corps, 
25,000 effectives, were under the command of General Heintzelman.

Besides têtes-de-pont at these two bridges, and the rifle-pits and abattis protecting the front of the two divisions near Seven Pines, a strong line had been constructed at right angles to, and south of, the Williamsburg road, about a mile and a half east of Seven Pines. This was called the “third line of defence”—it was unoccupied on the 30th of May. The third corps numbered 17,088 “total present” in camp on the 25th of May, but the effective force did not exceed 13,000 muskets. The fourth corps numbered, at the same time, 15,678 present in camp, or about 12,000 “effectives” for line of battle.

General Johnston's information on the 30th of May when he gave orders for battle—was not so specific as the foregoing—taken from General Mindil's account—but it was reasonably accurate in all essential particulars; including the probable reënforcement of the corps at Seven Pines.

Note.—In a work entitled “The Peninsula,” by General Alexander S. Webb, it is stated, page 97, that “the consolidated returns of the army (General McClellan's) show an aggregate of 126,089 officers and men present on May the 31st, with 280 pieces of field artillery.”

General Johnston's Plan and Intentions.—At 12.30 A.M. on the 31st, Gen. G. W. Smith, at his headquarters, on the Brook turnpike, about four miles from Richmond, received the following order from Gen. Johnston:

“Headquarters Department Northern Virginia, “May 30, 1862, 9.15 P.M.

“General:

“If nothing prevents we will fall upon the enemy in front of Major-General Hill—who occupies the position 
on the Williamsburg road from which your troops moved to the neighborhood of Meadow Bridges early in the morning—as early as practicable. The Chickahominy will be high—and passable only at the bridges—a great advantage to us. Please be ready to move by the Nine Miles road—coming as early as possible to the point at which the road to New Bridge turns off. Should there be cause of haste, General McLaws, on your approach, will be ordered to leave his ground for you, that he may reënforce General Longstreet.

“Most respectfully your obedient servant, “J. E. Johnston.”

“A copy of this has been sent to General Whiting who is directed to act upon this order in your absence.

“J. E. J.”

Before sunrise that morning General Smith reached General Johnston's headquarters near the Nine Miles road, in the north-east suburb of Richmond. He informed General Johnston that the head of the division, under Whiting, had moved before daylight, and would soon arrive at the point where the Nine Miles road leaves the city; and that it would be able to reach the point where the New Bridge road turns off by eight o'clock. He also informed General Johnston that the command of the remainder of the left wing of the army had been temporarily turned over to General A. P. Hill; who was ordered to place his own division nearer to Meadow Bridges—take command of D. R. Jones's troops and all others in that vicinity—and guard against any movement the enemy might make in that direction from the North bank of the Chickahominy.

General Smith told General Johnston that he did not propose relieving General Whiting of the command of 
the division; but that he would accompany it to the designated point, and take whatever part circumstances might require of him in the coming contest. General Johnston approved this, and at once explained his intentions. He said that Longstreet had been ordered to attack the enemy at Seven Pines, as early as possible that morning, with the whole right wing of the army. Longstreet's own division moving into action by the Nine Miles road, which it was already on, part of it three or four miles out from Richmond. D. H. Hill's division to move on the Williamsburg road—and Huger's on the Charles City road, in position to guard against any movement of the enemy on that side; and by lateral roads, come into action on the left flank of the enemy, in case the attack made by Longstreet's and Hill's divisions should meet with prolonged resistance.

One brigade and two regiments of McLaws's division were just east of the New Bridge fork of the Nine Miles road. Longstreet's division on the Nine Miles road could easily have reached that point—about one mile and a half from Fair Oaks station—before seven o'clock. D. H. Hill's division on the Williamsburg road could have moved up to his picket line before that time. General Johnston expected a crushing blow to be struck in the vicinity of Seven Pines by 8 A.M.—and hoped that it would be completely successful before reënforcements of the enemy could reach that point, from the direction of Bottom's Bridge, or from the North bank of the Chickahominy.

But, to provide against contingencies—be ready to meet any reënforcements the enemy might send across the Chickahominy—and be within supporting distance in case Longstreet should need help in his attack—General Johnston said he had considered it prudent to order 
the division under Whiting, from the left wing of the army to the right. He was well aware that three of the five corps of General McClellan's army were on the north bank of the Chickahominy—their right at Mechanicsville—and that all the crossings of the river had been for several days in the hands of the enemy. And he fully realized that whilst the bulk of the Confederate army was engaged at Seven Pines and beyond, Richmond would be in danger of attack coming from the north side of the river. He expressed his determination to take position with the supporting division on the Nine Miles road—leaving to General Longstreet the conduct of the attack on Seven Pines.

About 6 A.M. General Whiting, with the head of his column, reached the vicinity of General Johnston's headquarters; but was prevented from reaching the Nine Miles road by troops of Longstreet's division, who were across the line of march of Whiting's command; and were breaking up their camps, loading baggage wagons, and getting ready for march. In a short time General Whiting became very impatient. General Smith then sent an aide-de-camp to General Longstreet, informing him of the cause of delay, and requesting that it be remedied as soon as possible. This aide, Lieutenant R. F. Beckham, asked General Smith where General Longstreet was to be found. General Smith referred him to General Johnston, who was present at the time. The latter said that Longstreet's division was moving on the Nine Miles road, and that General Longstreet, in all probability, was with it. In about an hour General Smith received a note from his aide stating that the division was not on the Nine Miles road: adding, he would cross the country to the Williamsburg road and try to find General Longstreet. It was now about 9 A.M. and reports were coming in, from our line along the crest of the Chickahominy Bluffs, between New Bridge and the Mechanicsville road, indicating some movement of the enemy on the north bank of the river. By this time Longstreet's troops and baggage trains had ceased crossing Whiting's line of march; but, General Johnston directed that Whiting should not move further until it could be determined where Longstreet's division was.

When General Johnston learned that General Smith's aide reported that Longstreet's division was not on the Nine Miles road—he sent one of his own aides to General Longstreet with instructions to send back at least three brigades to that road, if they had not moved so far as to make the change involve a serious loss of time. General Johnston's aide went rapidly on the Nine Miles road, in search of General Longstreet, and soon found himself within the enemy's picket lines—a prisoner.

The foregoing statement of General Johnston's intentions is different from that given by many writers. For that reason the following documentary proof is presented here:

First. Extracts from a letter addressed to General G. W. Smith, dated February 7, 1863, written by R. F. Beckham, Major of Ordnance, who was a lieutenant and General Smith's aide at the battle of Seven Pines. He says: “I was directed to carry an order to General Longstreet urging him to push forward with his division so that the road might be cleared to enable your division to take up the march. . . . I then asked General Johnston if he could give me any idea of General Longstreet's whereabouts. His reply was that he did not know, but that he ought to be on the march on the Nine Miles road. With instructions to find him if possible, I started off, but could learn nothing of him on the route 
indicated by General Johnston. After having gone as far as was necessary to satisfy me that General Longstreet's division was not on the Nine Miles road, I sent, by courier, a note to you stating this fact; and I also remember to have said in it that I would go over to the Williamsburg, or old stage road, and see if General Longstreet could be found there. I found his headquarters at a house on the side of the road, belonging, I think, to a Mr. Poor, and there delivered to him the order given me. Kemper's brigade, which formed a part of General Longstreet's division, was at a halt on the road when I got to General Longstreet's headquarters, and, what surprised me most, was accompanied by wagons loaded with baggage and camp equipage. You will remember that I mentioned this thing to you when I came back to General Johnston's headquarters. I do not remember at what hour I reached General Longstreet. Judging from the time of my joining you at General Johnston's, and the time which must have elapsed before the order was given me, I would suppose it to have been about ten o'clock when I reached Poor's house.”

Second. The following extract is from a letter dated Richmond, June 28th, 1862, written by General J. E. Johnston to General G. W. Smith: “I enclose herewith the first three sheets of your report, to ask a modification—or omission rather. They contain two subjects which I never intended to make generally known, and which I have mentioned to no one but yourself—and mentioned to you as I have been in the habit of doing everything of interest in the military way. I refer to the mention of the misunderstanding between Longstreet and myself in regard to the direction of his division—and that of his note to me, received about 4 
o'clock, complaining of my slowness—which note I showed you. As it seems to me that both of these matters concern Longstrret and myself alone, I have no hesitation in asking you to strike them out of your report—as they in no manner concern your operations. I received information of Longstreet's misunderstanding (which may be my fault as I told you at the time) while his troops were moving to the Williamsburg road, and sent to Longstreet to send three brigades by the Nine Miles road, if they had not marched so far as to make the change involve a serious loss of time. This, after telling you of the misunderstanding. Your march from General Semmes's headquarters was not in consequence of the letter from Longstreet. Whiting* had gone at my request, with your permission, to ascertain the state of things with Longstreet. Just before 4 o'clock we heard musketry for the first time, and Whiting† was ordered to advance. Just then Major Whiting rode up and reported from Longstreet—and a moment after the note was brought me—which, after reading it, I showed it to you.”

Third. The following is a copy of the three sheets of General Smith's report addressed to Major Thomas G. Rhett, Adjutant-General, Department of Northern Virginia, and returned by General Johnston. The portions which were omitted, at the request of General Johnston, are placed in italics and marked by brackets.



* Major Jasper Whiting, General G. W. Smith's chief of staff.

† Brigadier-General W. H. C. Whiting, commanding Smith's division.


 “Richmond, Va., June 23d, 1862.

“Major:

“On the 28th of May, by direction of General Johnston, I assumed command of the left wing of the army, and on the same day placed my own division temporarily under command of the Senior Brigadier-General, W. H. C. Whiting. At half-past 12 o'clock on the morning of the 31st of May, at my headquarters on the Brook Turnpike, I received a note from General Johnston directing that my division should take position as soon as practicable upon the Nine Miles road, near the New Bridge fork, ready to support, if necessary, the divisions upon the right in an attack upon the enemy which was to be made early in the morning. I was informed that, in case my division did not arrive in time, a portion of the troops composing the centre would be moved forward, and I was directed, in that event, to replace the troops, thus moved, by my division. [On arriving at the headquarters of General Johnston, about sunrise, I learned from him that his intention was that General Longstreet's division should move by the Nine Miles road—that of General D. H. Hill by the Williamsburg stage road—and General Huger's by the Charles City road. The enemy it was understood had already upon this side of the Chickahominy river a force variously estimated at from twenty to forty thousand men. The recent rains had materially increased the difficulty of crossing that stream; and notwithstanding the very bad condition of the roads over which we had to pass, and the boggy, swampy condition of the fields and woods through which our troops would have to operate, it was believed that an energetic attack, early in the morning, properly supported and followed up, would result in defeat to that portion of 
the enemy already upon this side, before the other, portion of their army could cross the swollen river; either to reënforce their troops, or to attack the city in our rear. About 8 o'clock, I directed Captain Beckham, Aide-de-Camp, to see General Longstreet on the Nine Miles road, and learn from him the state of affairs, and communicate to me all the information he could obtain in regard to the probable movements of the troops under General Longstreet, in order that I might understandingly give instructions to General Whiting, who had arrived with the head of the division near General Johnston's headquarters—having been for some time waiting for General Longstreet's troops to pass. In about an hour I learned by note from Captain Beckham that neither General Longstreet nor any portion of his command were on the Nine Miles road. This note was immediately shown to General Johnston, who despatched his Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant Washington, to General Longstreet with directions to turn his division into the Nine Miles road, provided it could be done without material loss of time. This message did not reach General Longstreet. General Johnston's intentions as then explained to me were that whilst General D. H. Hill's division was attacking the enemy's advanced position on the Williamsburg stage road in front, General Huger's division, from the Charles City road, would attack the left flank, and General Longstreet's division would engage the enemy on Hill's left. An hour later Captain Beckham reported that he had found Longstreet's division on the Williamsburg road, halted, for the purpose of allowing General D. H. Hill's troops to file by; and soon after returned with information that General Hill's troops had passed, and that General Longstreet was making all his dispositions 
to attack the enemy in conjunction with General Hill's division on the Williamsburg road—his own division being held in reserve on that road.] I then directed General Whiting to move three brigades, viz.: his own, Hood's, and Pettigrew's, near to the fork of the Nine Miles and New Bridge roads; and placed the other two—Hatton's and Hampton's—in reserve near Mrs. Christian's farm. About one o'clock I rejoined General Johnston at the head of the three brigades in position upon the Nine Miles road, and found him anxiously awaiting the development of affairs upon our right. As the day wore on and nothing decisive was heard from General Longstreet's attack, except occasional firing of cannon, and, for some two or three hours, but little musketry, it seemed that no real attack was likely to be made that day, at least. [But between four and five o'clock a note was received from General Longstreet stating that he had attacked and beaten the enemy after several hours, severe fighting; that he had been disappointed in not receiving assistance upon his left; and, although it was now nearly too late, that an attack, by the Nine Mile road, upon the right flank and rear of the enemy would probably yet enable him to drive them into the Chickahominy before dark.”]

The marked portions of the foregoing quotation from General Smith's report are those indicated in pencil by General Johnston, on the return sheets, with a request that they be omitted. This request was based upon his statement that he did not intend to make generally known either Longstreet's note or the misunderstanding between Longstreet and himself in regard to the direction in which Longstreet's division was to move into action; and, upon his opinion that this misunderstanding in no manner concerned the operations of the division, under 

Whiting, which bore General Smith's name. Although satisfied, at the time, that General Johnston was mistaken in this opinion, General Smith, whose health was then in a very critical condition, complied with the request of General Johnston, who was lying seriously wounded.

After General Johnston had been informed that Longstreet's division had crossed over to the Williamsburg road, he still had full faith in the ability of the 30,000 men, under Longstreet, to crush the enemy in the vicinity of Seven Pines. In view of this fact, the move-movements of Smith's division under Whiting, which were directed by General Johnston in person, from soon after sunrise until a little before sunset that day, become easily intelligible. Until it was known that the action had fully commenced on the Williamsburg road General Johnston held the supporting division on the Nine Miles road, just within McLaws's picket line. To have moved it farther to the front would have brought it immediately in contact with the enemy, and this would have begun the battle by placing first in action the only force available for holding in check reënforcements the enemy might send from the north bank of the river. In short, would have radically changed General Johnston's plan.

When the heavy musketry firing was heard, in the direction of Seven Pines, there was no longer any necessity for holding the supporting division within the Confederate picket line; and, General Johnston would, no doubt, have ordered this division forward, without waiting for Longstreet's note calling for help. But the hurried advance of this division, into action, directed by General Johnston, in person, would hardly have been so urgently pressed, but for the character of Longstreet's 
note, received at the moment the musketry firing was first heard. This note was taken as sufficient evidence that the time had come when the supporting division was needed, in close action, against the enemy in front of Longstreet.

Before giving an account of the operations that followed on the Nine Miles road, attention is called to the following extracts from a leter written by General C. M. Wilcox, dated March 24th, 1875, addressed to General G. W. Smith, giving a description of the movements of three brigades of Longstreet's division on the 31st of May. He says: “I send you the map of Seven Pines. I cannot, as you requested, mark on the map where my command was on the night of the 30th; but, it was about three and a half miles from Richmond on the road that crossed the Chickahominy at New Bridge. We left camp before sun up, and halted near the forks of the Williamsburg and Charles City roads. Remained at the forks of the road until about 3 P.M., then moved down the Charles City road with my own, Pryor's and Colston's brigades of Longstreet's division, and Armistead's and Blanchard's brigades of Huger's division. We were ordered to keep abreast of the musketry then raging fiercely on the Williamsburg road, but nearly a mile off apparently, though in reality a great deal farther in front of us. We moved more than a mile down the Charles City road, and were then ordered, by Longstreet, back to the forks of the road and to move down the Williamsburg road. We had nearly reached the forks when ordered back down the Charles City road, guided by a courier—and to cross over to the Williamsburg road, more than a mile in rear of the fighting, where Longstreet was personally. I was ordered forward, with my own brigade and Pryor's, to report to General D. H. Hill. 

Reached him after sunset. One of my regiments, a part of it, engaged, and Colonel Moore, 11th Ala., mortally wounded. At ten o'clock P.M. was ordered by Hill, conducted by one of R. H. Anderson's staff, to move to the front and relieve Anderson's brigade. Found him near two houses, east of Seven Pines—marked on the map by two dots. One regiment, the 19th Miss., farther east, several hundred yards, on picket. Armistead, or a part of his brigade, was a little to the left of Pryor.”

Had Longstreet's division, 14,000, moved on the Nine Miles road at daylight—D. H. Hill's, 11,000 at the same time on the Williamsburg road—and Huger's 5000, on Hill's right by the Charles City road—General Johnston's plan would have been carried out; and his expectations in regard to the success of the attack, he had ordered to be made by the right wing of his army, would, in all probability, have been realized. But, without dwelling longer, at this time, upon what was intended by General Johnston—or what might have happened if his intentions had been carried into effect—an account of what occurred near Fair Oaks, that day, will now be given.


CHAPTER IV.

Operations on the Nine Miles road—casualties in G. W. Smith's division, under General Whiting—letter from one of General Whiting's staff officers—General Smith meets the President and General Lee—the situation after dark.

After General Johnston received General Longstreet's note, at four o'clock P.M., it seemed clear that the enemy in the vicinity of Seven Pines had already been 
largely reënforced. For this reason the division on the Nine Miles road, held in observation until that time, was pushed rapidly in the direction of Seven Pines—to assist Longstreet—without further regard to reënforcements of the enemy from the north bank of the river. The three brigades at hand were moved at once—General Johnston directing the movement in person. General Smith was ordered to have Hampton's and Hatton's brigades brought up rapidly, from the position in which they had been placed by direction of General Johnston, and follow the other three brigades. In a few minutes, General Smith, having learned that Hampton and Hatton were in motion, joined Generals Johnston and Whiting in the advance.

A little more than half a mile east of the New Bridge fork of the Nine Miles road the troops swept over the intrenched picket line, and supports, of the enemy, without a halt; passed through their camps, and the head of the column had about reached the point where the Nine Miles road crosses the Richmond and York River Railroad, at Fair Oaks station, when they were fired upon, from a point five or six hundred yards north of that station. At this time Generals Johnston and Whiting were in the advance. General Smith had halted, about half a mile back, in order to give instructions to General Hampton—the head of whose brigade had just reached the rear of Pettigrew's.

In the mean time General Johnston had ordered Hood's brigade to bear to the right—and assist Longstreet in the direct attack. When General Hampton came up to the point at which General Smith had halted, the latter directed him to move his brigade by a wood road, leading to the left and front; and, after gaining a little more than a brigade length, resume his line of march parallel to the Nine Miles road, which would bring him into line of battle on Pettigrew's left. Hatton was ordered to continue his march on the Nine Miles road; this would place his brigade in reserve behind the line formed by Whiting's, Pettigrew's, and Hampton's brigades.

Upon reaching the edge of the dense wood, some three hundred yards from the clump of trees at Fair Oaks station, General Smith saw the brigades of Whiting and Pettigrew moving into action north of Fair Oaks. For a few minutes it seemed probable that Hampton's brigade in the dense wood—under orders just given by General Smith—would come in collision with the leading brigades, now moving in a direction almost exactly opposite to that contemplated at the time the orders were given to Hampton. Information of the movement of the latter was at once communicated to the two leading brigade commanders and to General Whiting. In a very short time the three brigade commanders understood each others position: and preparations were made to attack the battery again. This attack was repulsed, and in a few minutes our troops, on the right, came streaming back in the direction of the clump of trees at Fair Oaks—two batteries seemed to open upon us.

It was now clear that the movement upon Seven Pines, to assist Longstreet in his attack on that place, must be changed into resisting reënforcements of the enemy that had evidently come from the north bank of the Chickahominy. This was the principal, original purpose in ordering Smith's division from the left wing of the army. Longstreet, from last accounts, was not more than equal to the task of beating the enemy already in his front. This new movement was against his left flank and rear; and must be stopped before it reached him.

When our troops were beaten back, and the two batteries opened upon us, General Johnstou was at the grove near Fair Oaks, and General Smith was at the point from which he had first observed the two leading brigades moving into action. It was now near six o'clock P.M. General Johnston sent word to General Smith to have all the available troops brought up quickly. Hatton's brigade had just arrived, and was in the open field north of the Nine Miles road, between the large woods and Fair Oaks. General Smith sent General Johnston's order to the nearest of Magruder's brigade commanders direct. In the mean time the men who had been driven back on our right had reformed and were again fighting. The firing was redoubled. On receipt of General Johnston's order to have the troops brought up, General Smith ordered Hatton's brigade and Lightfoot's regiment of Pettigrew's brigade, which was in reserve in the oat field, to move into the wood north of Fair Oaks—take position in the front line—and drive the enemy back if possible. He went into action with these troops; and had not proceeded far in the wood before he met General Hampton. The enemy's line of infantry was very close to that of Hampton, whose ranks had been much opened in order to prevent his left flank from being overlapped. Hatton's brigade and Lightfoot's regiment formed in the front line with the troops already engaged. General Hatton was killed just as his troops reached the extreme front; about the same time General Pettigrew was wounded (supposed mortally), and was taken prisoner; and a few minutes later, General Hampton was wounded and disabled.

Repeated attempts were made to force the enemy back; but, no perceptible change occurred in their line or ours, on that part of the field, after General Smith reached the extreme front. The conflict was close and 
deadly—a large proportion of field officers were killed or disabled. At dark we had failed to drive the enemy back—but we had stopped their movement upon the left flank and rear of Longstreet's forces at Seven Pines.

When it became almost too dark in the wood to distinguish friend from foe—and the firing had virtually ceased—General Smith gave directions to have word passed along the line to fall back slowly and reform in the open field, about one hundred yards to the rear. He then rode back through this field to the Nine Miles road. One or two of Magruder's brigades came up just before dark, but too late to take any part in the action. Hood's brigade—which had been sent direct to Longstreet's assistance by General Johnston—had been recalled—but did not reach Fair Oaks until the battle was ended, at dark.

The following official report shows the number of killed, wounded, and missing in each brigade of G. W. Smith's division. The division was commanded by Brigadier-General W. H. C. Whiting.

“Consolidated report of casualties in the 1st Division, 1st Corps, May 31, 1862: Brigades. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total. 
1st Brigade—Hood None 13 None 13 
2d Brigade—Hampton 45 284 None 329 
3d Brigade—Whiting 28 286 42 356 
4th Brigade—Pettigrew 47 240 54 341 
5th Brigade—Hatton 44 187 13 244 
164 1010 109 1283 



“Respectfully submitted,

“John T. Darby,

“Acting Chief Surgeon, 1st Division, 1st Corps.”


This division was 10,500 strong. The four brigades engaged numbered something over 8000. The Confederates had no artillery in this action, because of the boggy nature of the ground, and the hurried character of the movement called for by General Longstreet's note to General Johnston.

An officer of General Whiting's staff describes the movements of this division on the 31st of May.—The following extract is from a letter dated Milledgeville, Ga., February, 1868, addressed to General G. W. Smith by Colonel B. W. Frobel, of the Confederate States Engineers, who was a Major on General Whiting's staff at the battle of Seven Pines: “You ask me to give you my recollection of the part taken by your division in the battle of Seven Pines, and I do so with pleasure. On the night of the 30th of May we were encamped at Dill's farm near the Meadow Bridge road. About midnight an order was received from General Johnston directing us to prepare for action. General W. H. C. Whiting was at that time commanding your division, you [illegible text] [illegible text] command of the left wing of the army. About 3.30 A.M. I was sent by General Whiting down the Nine Miles road, to make myself familiar with it, that I might make no mistake in guiding Pettigrew's brigade down that road to the position assigned them in the coming battle. Pettigrew moved out of camp about 6 A.M. On reaching the Nine Miles road in the vicinity of General Johnston's headquarters, we found other portions of the division halted, as I afterwards learned, to let Longstreet's troops pass. These troops were moving across the Nine Miles road to the right. So soon as they were out of the way we moved on, as rapidly as the condition of the roads would admit, to a position near the forks of the Nine Miles and New Bridge roads. Here we halted and formed line of battle, waiting for the signal to advance, which was to be heavy firing on our right from Longstreet's troops, who were on the Williamsburg road. General Johnston, as well as yourself, had accompanied the division, and both of you were with it at this time. After waiting several hours, near 5 P.M. the signal was heard. Orders were at once given to advance, which we did, driving the enemy before us, with scarcely a show of resistance, to the open field near the small house where General Johnston was afterward wounded. Hood's brigade was moving on the right of the Nine Miles road, and Whiting's brigade on the left. Hampton and Pettigrew were still farther to the left, and Hatton in reserve. Generals Johnston and Whiting were following immediately after Whiting's brigade. As Whiting's brigade reached the road near the railroad crossing, I was sent to halt it. On returning after doing this, I joined Generals Whiting and Johnston, who were riding toward the crossing. General Whiting was expostulating with General Johnston about taking the division across the railroad—insisting that the enemy were in force on our left flank and rear. General Johnston replied, ‘Oh! General Whiting, you are too cautious.’ At this time we reached the crossing, and nearly at the same moment the enemy opened an artillery fire from the direction pointed out by General Whiting. We moved back up the road near the small white house. Whiting's brigade was gone—it had been ordered forward to charge the batteries which were firing on us. The brigade was repulsed, and in a few minutes came streaming back through the little skirt of woods to the left of the Nine Miles road near the crossing. There was only a part of the brigade in this charge. Pender soon rallied and re-formed these on the edge of the woods. General Whiting sent an order to him to reconnoitre the batteries, and if he thought they could be taken, to try it again. Before he could do so some one galloped up, shouting ‘Charge that battery!’ The men moved forward at a double-quick, but were repulsed as before, and driven back to the woods. In the mean time there was heavy fighting going on to the left, Hatton's, Hampton's and Pettigrew's brigades having engaged the enemy in that direction. At this moment matters had become so critical on that portion of the field that, although not commanding the division, you had gone to Hampton's and Hatton's brigades and taken a personal supervision over their immediate line of battle. Hampton was wounded, Pettigrew wounded and a prisoner, and Hatton killed, and his brigade much demoralized. At this time I was ordered to bring up Hood. I found him to the right of the railroad, a little to the left of the Williamsburg road and not a great way from Seven Pines. By the time he reached the position indicated on the left of the railroad it was nearly dark. I joined General Whiting and yourself in the little oat-field where the battle began, and about two hundred yards from the place where General Johnston had been wounded. Whiting's brigade still held the wood where they had made their first charge, and so did Hampton's, Hatton's, and Pettigrew's brigades. You immediately set about reforming our lines.”

General Smith meets the President, and sends for General Longstreet.—When General Smith, at dark, ordered the line to withdraw a short distance and re-form in the open field, he had not heard that General Johnston was wounded, and he knew nothing of what had occurred in the right wing of the army later than General Longstreet's note to General Johnston received at 4 P.M. 

Just after leaving the wood General Smith was informed that General Johnston had been disabled and taken from the field; and within three minutes thereafter he reached the point in the oat-field near the Nine Miles road from which he first saw the brigades of Whiting and Pettigrew moving into action. He there met President Davis and General Lee. In answer to inquiries made by the President General Smith explained fully what he knew of General Johnston's intentions and expectations at sunrise that morning, as already stated—the unexpected movement of Longstreet's troops from the Nine Miles road to the Williamsburg road—the consequent delays—the note received by General Johnston from General Longstreet at 4 P.M. asking for help—the hurried movement made under General Johnston's immediate personal direction in aid of Longstreet—the sudden appearance of the enemy from the north bank of the Chickahominy which resulted in the contest north of Fair Oaks—General Johnston's order for all of the troops that were within reach to be brought up rapidly—described the contest that had occurred in the woods, on the left of our line—and then asked if anything had been heard on the Nine Miles road from the 30,000 men under Longstreet—later than the note received by General Johnston at 4 o'clock.

Nothing further had been heard, and the President then asked General Smith what were his plans. In answer General Smith told him that he could not understandingly determine what was best to be done until something was known of the condition of affairs in the right wing of the army—and some data obtained in regard to the position and strength of the enemy on that side; and added it might be found expedient to withdraw to better ground covering Richmond, or it might not—all depended on what had occurred in the right wing.

The President suggested that, if we remained, the enemy might withdraw during the night, which would give us the moral effect of a victory. General Smith replied that he would not withdraw without good reason—all would depend upon what had occurred on the Williamsburg road—nothing had happened on our side to make it necessary to retire. Soon after this, the President and General Lee rode away. General Smith sent parties, by different routes, to communicate with General Longstreet and request him to come over to the Nine Miles road for conference and instructions; and arranged with General Whiting the rectification of his lines upon the field—and the reorganization of the brigades which had lost their commanders and a large portion of field officers.

A short time after dark, General J. E. B. Stuart, who had been, during the day, on the extreme right, with a portion of the cavalry, picketing the Charles City road and the White Oak Swamp, reached the field near Fair Oaks, and informed General Smith that the enemy had not moved south of Williamsburg road, from the position they had held at White Oak Bridge—that, our troops had carried the intrenched position at Seven Pines some time before sunset, and had moved beyond that point—but he did not know how far. He had several good guides with him, and he offered to go in person to General Longstreet and have him piloted to the headquarters on the Nine Miles road. The gap between Whiting's right and Longstreet's left was then believed to be about a mile.

The situation after dark.—When General Smith succeeded to the command the condition of affairs was not 
what General Johnston had hoped for and expected at sunrise that morning. The sudden and, if possible, crushing blow which he intended should be delivered early in the morning, had been delayed until the afternoon—time had been allowed for the enemy to bring up reënforcements to Seven Pines from the direction of Bottom's Bridge—and to bring on to the field, north of Fair Oaks, reënforcements from the left bank of the Chickahominy. Whilst the Confederates had succeeded finally in carrying the works at Seven Pines, the contest on that part of the field only ceased at dark, and was indecisive. North of Fair Oaks the Confederate troops that were moving by the Nine Miles road to Longstreet's support at Seven Pines, had been interrupted in their march by heavy reënforcements of the enemy from the left bank of the Chickahominy. These reënforcements were checked in their forward movement, but the Confederate attempt to drive them back into or across the river in their rear, had failed.

After the President and General Lee left the field Hood's brigade was placed along the Nine Miles road, its right a little west of Fair Oaks station; Whiting's brigade on the left of Hood's, extending into the large wood on the north of the Nine Miles road, and the other three brigades within close supporting distance. General Smith then returned to the headquarters on the Nine Miles road, near the New Bridge fork. About nine o'clock P.M. the following was received there from General McLaws: “I am at the position opposite the New Bridge. The colonel in command informs me that there is a heavy force opposite this point, and that this evening the pickets reported that the enemy had been throwing heavy objects in the river. As pontoon boats have been seen there, it is supposed they are making a pontoon bridge. The force to guard this point is two regiments. . . . We have no force to fill up the gap between this and your left except two regiments of Kershaw's, and Semmes's brigade. . . . If this position is forced your command will be in great danger, as you are aware.”

About the same time General A. P. Hill, temporarily commanding the left wing of the army, reported that all had been quiet during the day near Meadow Bridges in front of his division; but the enemy's batteries in the vicinity of Mechanicsville had been firing heavily without inflicting any material damage. About half-past eleven o'clock the following, dated 11 P.M., was received from General McLaws: “The positions of the troops are as follows: General Cobb, five regiments, from the Mechanicsville road to General Harvey's place; General Kershaw from General Harvey's to Baker's; Generals Griffith and Semmes from General Kershaw's right to New Bridge, and on the line down New Bridge road and across the country to connect with the railroad. Notice has been received that General Cobb's brigade is to be relieved from Mechanicsville and sent towards the right—the arrangement of the troops will be relatively the same, but more concentrated.”

A short time before midnight General Smith received a note from General Stuart stating that, at half-past ten o'clock P.M., he had failed to find General Longstreet. At midnight General Smith had heard nothing from General Longstreet.

General Whiting's division, in front of the enemy, was supported by a very thin line on the left, and on its right there was a gap—supposed to be about a mile—between Whiting's troops and the right wing of the army, under Longstreet, east of Seven Pines. At forty minutes after midnight General Smith wrote to General Longstreet asking the position of his command at dark, the condition of his men, and requesting his views in regard to the operations to be undertaken in his front that morning.

At this time General Smith supposed that all the troops of the right wing of the army bad been closely engaged from early in the afternoon until dark; he knew that heavy reënforcements of the enemy from the north bank of the Chickahominy had come over the river late in the afternoon—had no reason to believe that all the bridges had become impassable—therefore, assumed that additional reënforcements might arrive during the night, and did not know at what point in our rear the enemy might cross the very slightly-guarded river.


CHAPTER V.


General Mindil's account of Federal operations on the 31st of May Correspondence between Generals Johnston and Smith.

General Mindil says:* “There were no troops in position on Casey's left, and his line on that flank only extended some two hundred yards beyond the main road. Had Longstreet, with but half of his division, moved promptly forward and occupied the ground to Casey's left—and there was nothing to prevent him—he would have reached the flank and rear of the Union line, just where Huger was expected to strike it after a wide detour. To wait for Huger six hours before commencing 

* “The Battle of Fair Oaks,” by General G. W. Mindil, p. 3.


the attack, and then to withhold two strong divisions for four hours more, was certainly not great generalship. Such a movement by Longstreet as we have just described would in itself have been decisive. . . . The troops (Casey's division) were ordered under arms, the artillery was brought into position, and a line of battle was formed about one third of a mile in front of the intrenchments. At about half-past one o'clock this line met Hill's fierce onset, and though resisting gallantly, was soon obliged to retire. . . . At the intrenchments the fighting was heavy and severe, but by dint of superior numbers in front and in flank (Rain's brigade having turned the redoubt) Casey was compelled to relinquish his works. So sudden and unexpected was the flank movement of the Confederates on the left, that the Union troops retired rapidly, and in some confusion. The greater part of Casey's division did not again become engaged, but retired to ‘the third line of defence,’ where they were re-formed and supplied with ammunition. . . . But Keyes did have in position along the Nine Miles road the division of General Couch, about 7000 strong, the gallant remnant of Naglee's brigade, some 1200 more, and four or five batteries of artillery. Against this force, partly protected by an abattis and a line of low rifle-pits, Hill's troops, now re-formed and reënforced by Longstreet's brigade, under Anderson, were directed to advance. . . . In their advance the Confederates were exposed to a galling fire in front, as well as to a most destructive fire in flank, from Kearney's troops, that Heintzelman had pushed forward. Berry's brigade, under the intrepid Kearney, swept like a gale through the woods on the left of the road, and in the audacious advance soon drove the foe out of the slashing in their front, and occupying the felled timber themselves, soon commanded with their rifles the left of Casey's abandoned camps. In this advanced but well-protected position Kearney changed his front to the right, and at once ordered a terrible fire of musketry against the flank of the Confederate column pushing east along the Williamsburg road. Jameson's brigade of Kearney's division now reached the field. . . One division of Heintzelman's (corps) had now been brought into action, and its determined attack and splendid fighting encouraged to renewed efforts the brave but almost exhausted men of Couch's line. . . . The annoying fire of his (Kearney's) troops on the Confederate flank and rear caused the latter to cross to the north of the road, there to add their weight to the already too heavy column engaged with Couch. . . . This overwhelming advance on Couch's right could not be resisted, and a rapid change of front to the rear on the left battalion opposed a new oblique line of battle, facing north-west, against the advance of the Southern columns. General Couch, a few moments previous to this break in his line, had passed over to the railroad, taking with him three of his regiments to reënforce the small force consisting of Brady's battery of four guns, and the Thirty-first Pennsylvania regiment of infantry, hotly engaged near the station with Smith's advance. . . . Longstreet, by pushing across the Nine Mile road, had isolated Couch with his battery and four regiments from the rest of his division. . . . It was now five o'clock, and Kearney was still holding the advance position on the extreme left, while the brigades of Devens, Abercrombie, Peck, and Naglee, near Seven Pines, were stubbornly contesting every foot of ground. . . . Birney's brigade—which had halted on the railroad, owing to a most unfortunate conflict in orders for which he 
was not responsible—had not fired a shot—was now again directed to advance, and Birney had hardly passed half a mile to the front when his skirmishers were fired upon from a piece of woods running south from the railroad and skirting the western front of Mrs. E. Allen's farm. . . . And he was just in time, after a bloody encounter, to repulse a formidable flank movement then in progress against Keyes's right. The Confederates, after crossing the Nine Miles road, had advanced their left column along a farm road running parallel with and about equidistant to the railroad and Williamsburg road, and it was on this small road, near the south-west corner of the Allen field, that Birney struck their head of column and caused them to desist from their efforts in that direction. . . . Darkness was rapidly approaching, and Longstreet and Hill now redoubled their efforts to drive from the shelter of the wood, between the farm road just referred to and the Williamsburg road, and east of the Nine Miles road, the Union troops that had so gallantly disputed its possession. . . . Kearney, with Berry's brigade, held his position far to the front and on the extreme left, but the Confederate advance beyond the Seven Pines had cut him off from the rest of his troops. . . . Facing the Thirty-seventh New York regiment to the rear, under cover of their fire, he quickly withdrew his intercepted regiments, passing over a wood road, via Anderson's Mill, into the White Oak Swamp, and from there, by a short detour, regaining the Williamsburg road. By this bold manœuvre he not only saved his regiments, but reached the intrenched line in time to aid in organizing its defence, and in again pushing forward some of his gallant men to the aid of the main line, still contesting every inch of ground three fourths of a mile in front. The last 
attack of the enemy was made in deep masses just before dark, and met with a complete repulse.”

In reference to the movements of General Sumner's column and that portion of General Couch's division which was cut off and thrown back north of the railroad, General Mindil says:* “About four o'clock in the afternoon of May 31st while Longstreet and Hill, with their divisions, were still struggling in vain to force the abattis in Couch's front, the Confederate chieftain, ‘deeming it idle to keep General Smith longer out of action for a contingency so remote as the coming of reënforcements from the Federal right,’ gave orders for the troops massed on the Nine Mile road to move forward into battle. The two advance brigades of Law (Whiting's) and Pettigrew were gallantly met by the 31st Pennsylvania regiment and Brady's battery, afterward reënforced by three additional regiments under General Couch in person. Johnston, believing that this small force of Union troops was already attacked by numbers sufficiently strong to insure their defeat, passed to the south of the railroad with Hood's brigade, and ordered it into line on Longstreet's left. . . . As early as two o'clock P.M. General Heintzelman had sent to Generals McClellan and Sumner for aid. And it was in response to his repeated calls that Sumner put his divisions in march, arriving with Sedgwick's near the field of battle at a most critical time, when the new flank movement of Smith's column was dangerously threatening Heintzelman's right. The defeated forces under General Couch, heretofore alluded to as being cut off from the remainder of his command, after gallantly contesting the Confederates’ overwhelming advance, had slowly retired, in good order, in the direction of the Chickahominy bridges, where aid, if any, could be expected. 

* “The Battle of Fair Oaks,” by General G. W. Mindil, p. 8.


To this force were joined the advancing regiments under Sedgwick and a new forward movement commenced. The Confederates that had been pushing Couch were now pressed back in turn; and General Johnston, seeing this new reënforcement suddenly appear on the field, ordered Smith to desist from his advance to the south of the railroad, and to change front against the line of blue now rapidly advancing with all the enthusiasm of success. Smith's five brigades were ordered into action, and the division of General Magruder was brought up to the support. Charge after charge, with the most reckless daring, was made against the Union line, but each in turn was disastrously repulsed. Kirby's battery of regulars, formerly Magruder's, succeeded in crossing with the infantry. . . . Three separate charges were made on the guns, but Kirby fired them with a rapidity never surpassed, and the deadly volleys of grape and canister, at short range, poured into the enemy's ranks, caused him to stagger, reel, then fall back, while the second and third lines of the infantry, firing over the first, cut them down by hundreds. It was Sumner's turn to charge. . . . He hurled five regiments with fixed bayonets against the foe. The attack was irresistible; the enemy's line was broken and forced in disorder from the field to the dark belt of woods beyond. This heroic charge decided the battle on that flank, and darkness being near all firing soon ceased, General Sumner remaining in possession of the field he had so gallantly won. During the progress of the fighting we have just described, General Heintzelman was by no means idle. Feeling certain, between six and seven o'clock, that he had checked the enemy in his own front, and no longer fearing for his immediate right, he again ordered Birney forward in the direction 
of the heavy and continuous firing beyond the railroad. Birney met with but slight opposition in his advance, captured some two hundred prisoners, among them Colonel Bratton of the 6th South Carolina, and finally reached the open field (Hyer's) to Sumner's left rear; the 7th Massachusetts regiment being sent by Sumner to complete the connection. The battle of the day was over. . . . But seven pieces of artillery had reached the field (including Brady's); Richardson's division and the batteries of the corps not joining Sumner until after the action.”

It is thus seen that, a short time before dark, the Confederate right wing, thirty thousand men, under General Longstreet, had been so thoroughly checked, that General Heintzelman ordered Birney's brigade to move in the direction of the heavy and continuous firing, north of Fair Oaks station, where Sedgwick's division and four or five regiments from Couch's division, with seven pieces of artillery, well posted, were still being closely pressed by four brigades of the division under General Whiting—Hood's brigade of that division having been previously sent, by General Johnston, direct to Longstreet's assistance. In other words, the Confederate supporting force, on the Nine Miles road, after sending one brigade direct to Longstreet's assistance, had not only held at bay the Federal reënforcements from the north bank of the Chickahominy and the four (or more) regiments, and a battery cut off from Couch's division; but pressed them so hard that General Heintzelman, a short time before dark, detached a brigade from the forces that had thoroughly checked General Longstreet's advance and ordered it to move in the direction of the heavy and continued firing north of Fair Oaks station.

Extracts from Correspondence between Generals Johnston and Smith.—On the 19th of December, 1867, General J. E. Johnston wrote to General G. W. Smith, saying: “The accounts of Federal officers of our operations in 1862 have revived an intention that I formed at the close of the war to make a military report. To assist me in doing so I ask your evidence on two points in which you are no less interested than myself.” The first point referred to by General Johnston was the conference held at Richmond, in April. The second was in reference to Seven Pines. In regard to the latter General Johnston says: “General Sumner, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in his narrative, describes the opening of the battle and its continuance for a short time—and then says that five or six regiments which he had on the left of the artillery, charged over a broken fence and routed the rebels—and ended the battle for that day, the 31st. I can't contradict him with effect without official evidence. My recollection is very distinct of the impression that the action was terminated by night, and that you bivouacked on the ground.”

On the 23d of the same month General Smith replied, giving in substance what had occurred on the Confederate left that afternoon, and added, “There is a good deal yet to be told before the world will understand what occurred at Seven Pines or Fair Oaks. Have you ever seen the ‘History of the Army of the Potomac’ (Federal), by Swinton? He attributes to my slowness—or worse—the failure of your plans; and leaves the impression that his narrative of events on the Confederate side was obtained from yourself and General Longstreet. When you requested me to omit certain facts, stated in my hurried official report to you, because, in your opinion, they did not concern me or my command, I acceded to the earnest request of a friend, and directed the paragraphs indicated, in pencil, by you, to be omitted. And ‘History’ now says (see Swinton's ‘Army of the Potomac,’ p. 135), ‘Meantime, though the divisions of Longstreet and Hill had thus for three hours been vigorously pushing forward on the Williamsburg road, the column of G. W. Smith, to which had been intrusted the important flanking operation already indicated in Johnston's original plan, had not yet moved.’ And a good deal more of the same sort of ‘History’ about the battle of Seven Pines. . . . I have always regretted that the serious attack of illness which I suffered from on the 2d of June (the day after Lee relieved me—and from which I have never fully recovered) prevented my requiring all subordinates to make full reports to me of what transpired during the eighteen hours I commanded on that battle-field. . . . I am ‘interested,’ and I want all the facts known.”

On the 16th of January, 1868, General Johnston replied to the above, saying, “I thank you for your explanation of the incident in the battle of Fair Oaks, which is so magnified by General Sumner and Mr. Swinton. I regard the passage of Mr. Swinton's book, which you quote, and the next passage, as representing me (and truly) as fixing the time when your troops were put in motion. I think that examination of the two passages in connection will bring you to the same conclusion.”

General Smith wrote in reply to this, on the 19th of January, 1868, saying, “The question in reference to Swinton's account of the battle of Seven Pines, quoted in my letter of the 23d ult., is not as to whether you put my troops in motion at a given time, but in reference to the slowness of G. W. Smith in carrying out your ‘original plan.’ ”

General Johnston replied to this on the 21st of January, but confined his remarks exclusively to the first of the two points referred to in his letter of the 19th of December. He made no allusion to ‘his original plan’—Swinton's history—or the Battle of Seven Pines.

Colonel Frobel in his letter addressed to General Smith, already quoted from, says: “You have called my attention to the account given by Mr. Swinton—in his ‘History of the Army of the Potomac’—of this battle. Mr. Swinton is surely greatly mistaken. The division was under the immediate command of General Whiting, and he directly under General Johnston, who was with the division the whole day until he was wounded late in the afternoon. I am satisfied that no blame can attach to General Whiting for not being on the field sooner. Mr. Swinton must also be mistaken about the slowness of that division frustrating an important flank movement indicated in ‘Johnston's original plan.’ I never heard of the movement until I saw it mentioned in Mr. Swinton's book, and certainly no mention was made of it in any battle order sent to our headquarters.”


CHAPTER VI.


Ex-President Davis's description of operations on the 31st of May. Author's comments.

The official position held at the time by Mr. Davis, his early education, service in the regular army of the United States and in the volunteers during the Mexican War, his experience in the civil service of the government 
of the United States, as Secretary of War, and in both houses of Congress—all tend to give weight to his opinions. As President of the Confederate States he was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, had access to all official information, and power to compel a complete exhibit of facts. In view of his experience, opportunities, and declared intentions, it would seem reasonable to suppose that his statements would be strictly correct.

The following quotations are from his account of this battle: * “In the forenoon of the 31st of May, riding out on the New Bridge road, I heard firing in the direction of Seven Pines. As I drew nearer, I saw General Whiting, with part of General Smith's division, file into the road in front of me; at the same time, I saw General Johnston ride across the field from a house before which General Lee's horse was standing. I turned down to the house and asked General Lee what the musketry firing meant. He replied by asking whether I had heard it, and was answered in the affirmative; he said he had been of that impression himself, but General Johnston had assured him it could be nothing more than an artillery duel. It is scarcely necessary to add that neither of us had been advised of a design to attack the enemy that day. We then walked out to the rear of the house to listen, and were satisfied that an action, or at least a severe skirmish, must be going on. General Johnston states in his report that the condition of the air was peculiarly unfavorable to the transmission of sound. . . . General Lee and myself then rode to the field of battle, which 

* “Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government,” by Jefferson Davis, Vol. II. p. 122.

may be briefly described as follows: the Chickahominy, flowing in front, is a deep, sluggish, and narrow river, bordered by marshes and covered with tangled wood. The line of battle extended along the Nine Mile road, across the York River Railroad and Williamsburg stage road. The enemy had constructed redoubts, with long lines of rifle-pits covered by abattis, from below Bottom's Bridge to within less than two miles of New Bridge, and had constructed bridges to connect his forces on the north and south sides of the Chickahominy. The left of his forces on the south side was thrown forward from the river, the right was on its bank, and covered by its slope. . . . Our main force was on the right flank of our position, extending on both sides of the Williamsburg road, near to its intersection with the Nine Mile road. This wing consisted of Hill's, Huger's, and Longstreet's divisions, with light batteries, and a small force of cavalry. The division of General G. W. Smith, less Hood's brigade, ordered to the right, formed the left wing, and its position was on the Nine Mile road. There were small tracts of cleared land, but most of the ground was wooded, and much of it so covered with water as to seriously embarrass the movement of the troops. When General Lee and I, riding down the Nine Mile road, reached the left of our line, we found the troops hotly engaged. Our men had driven the enemy from his advanced encampment, and he had fallen back behind an open field, to the bank of the river, where, in a dense wood, was concealed an infantry line, with artillery in position. Soon after our arrival, General Johnston, who had gone farther to the right, where the conflict was expected, and whither reënforcement from the left was marching, was brought back severely wounded, and, as soon as an ambulance could be obtained, was moved from the field. Our troops on the left made vigorous assaults under most disadvantageous circumstances. They made several gallant attempts to carry the enemy's position, but were each time repulsed with heavy loss. After a personal reconnaissance on the left of the open in our front, I sent one, then another, and another courier to General Magruder, directing him to send a force down by the wooded path, just under the bluff, to attack the enemy in flank and reverse. Impatient of delay, I had started to see General Magruder, when I met the third courier, who said he had not found General Magruder, but had delivered the message to Brigadier-General Griffith who was moving by the path designated, to make the attack. On returning to the field, I found that the attack in front had ceased; it was, therefore, too late for a single brigade to effect anything against the large force of the enemy, and messengers were sent through the wood to direct General Griffith to go back. The heavy rain during the night of the 30th had swollen the Chickahominy; it was rising when the battle of Seven Pines was fought, but had not reached such height as to prevent the enemy from using his bridges: consequently, General Sumner, during the engagement, brought over his corps as a reënforcement. He was on the north side of the river, had built two bridges to connect with the south side, and, though their coverings were loosened by the upward pressure of the rising water, they were not yet quite impassable. With the true instinct of the soldier to march upon fire, when the sound of the battle reached him, he formed his corps and stood under arms waiting for an order to advance. He came too soon for us, and, but for his forethought and promptitude, he would have arrived too late for his friends. It may be granted that his presence saved the left wing of the Federal Army from defeat. As we had permitted the enemy to fortify before our attack, it would have been better to have waited another day, until the bridges should have been rendered impassable by the rise of the river. General Lee, at night-fall, gave instructions to General Smith, the senior officer on that part of the battle-field, and left with me to return to Richmond. Thus far I have only attempted to describe events on the extreme left of the battle-field, being that part of which I had personal observation; but the larger force and consequently the more serious conflict were upon the right of the line. To these I will now refer. Our force there consisted of the divisions of Major-Generals D. H. Hill, Huger, and Longstreet, the latter in chief command. In his report first published in the ‘Southern Historical Society Papers,’ Vol. III. pp. 277, 278, he writes: ‘Agreeably to verbal instructions from the commanding General, the division of Major-General D. H. Hill was, on the morning of the 31st ult., formed at an early hour on the Williamsburg road, as the column of attack upon the enemy's front on that road. . . . The division of Major-General Huger was intended to make a strong flank movement around the left of the enemy's position and attack him in rear of that flank. . . . After waiting some six hours for these troops to get into position, I determined to move forward without regard to them, and gave orders to that effect to Major-General D. H. Hill. The forward movement began about two o'clock, and our skirmishers soon became engaged with those of the enemy. The entire division of General Hill became engaged about three o'clock, and drove the enemy speedily back, gaining possession of his abattis and part of his intrenched camp: General Rodes, by a movement to the right, driving in the enemy's left. The only reënforcements on the field in hand were my own brigades, of which Anderson's, Wilcox's, and Kemper's were put in by the front on the Williamsburg road, and Colston's and Pryor's by my right flank. At the same time the decided and gallant attack made by the other brigades gained entire possession of the enemy's position, with his artillery, camp equipage, etc. Anderson's brigade, under Colonel Jenkins, pressing forward rapidly, continued to drive the enemy until night-fall. . . . The conduct of the attack was left entirely to Major-General Hill. The entire success of the affair is sufficient evidence of his ability, courage, and skill.’ This tribute to General Hill was no more than has been awarded to him by others who knew of his services on that day, and was in keeping with the determined courage, vigilance, and daring exhibited by him on other fields.”

The Ex-President exonerates General Huger, and proceeds to say:* “From the final report of General Longstreet already cited, it appears that he was ordered to attack on the morning of the 31st, and he explains why it was postponed for six hours; then he states that it was commenced by the division of General D. H. Hill, which drove the enemy steadily back, pressing forward until night-fall. The movement of Rodes’ brigade on the right flank is credited with having contributed much to the dislodgment of the enemy from their abattis and first intrenchments. As just stated, General Longstreet reports a delay of some six hours in making this attack because he was waiting for General Huger, and then made it successfully with Hill's division 

* “The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government,” by Jefferson Davis, Vol. II. p. 127.


and some brigades of his own. These questions must naturally arise in the mind of the reader: Why did not our troops on the left, during this long delay, as well as during the period occupied by Hill's assault, co-operate in the attack? and why, the battle having been preconceived, were they so far removed as not to hear the first guns? The officers of the Federal army, when called before a committee of their Congress to inquire into the conduct of the war, have, by their testimony, made it quite plain that the divided condition of their troops and the length of time required for their concentration, after the battle commenced, rendered it practicable for our forces, if united, as taking the initiative they well might have been, to have crushed or put to flight first Keyes's and then Heintzelman's corps before Sumner crossed the Chickahominy, between five and six o'clock in the evening.”

Comments.—It was after four o'clock in the afternoon, and not in the forenoon, when General Johnston rode from the house Mr. Davis refers to. At that time heavy and continuous musketry firing had been distinctly heard, and General Johnston had received General Longstreet's note calling for help. Mr. Davis speaks as if the firing and the movement of the troops under Whiting—the conversation he had with General Lee—and his going to the rear of the house to listen—all occurred in the forenoon. This extreme inaccuracy is inexcusable in an account of a battle.

But this is of little importance compared with the gross errors contained in his description of the battlefield. The Chickahominy is about two miles from the right of the Federal position; which was on the Richmond and York River Railroad, near Fair Oaks. The Chickahominy flowed in rear of their troops on the Richmond side of the river, and not “in front.” He is equally in error in stating that “the enemy had constructed redoubts with long lines of rifle-pits covered by abattis, from below Bottom's Bridge to within less than two miles of New Bridge.” They had constructed a tête-de-pont at White Oak Bridge; another at Bottom's Bridge; a strong line of works at right angles to the Williamsburg road, about a mile and a half east of Seven Pines; and two lines of rifle-pits with abattis, from the Williamsburg road, in the vicinity of Seven Pines, to the railroad near Fair Oaks station. At a point half a mile west of Seven Pines, just south of the Williamsburg road, there was a small, unfinished, pentangular redoubt; and across the Nine Miles road, about a mile in advance of Fair Oaks station, the Federals had a line of rifle-pits supporting their pickets.

Mr. Davis says: “The division of General G. W. Smith, less Hood's brigade ordered to the right, formed the left wing of the Confederate forces.” But, he knew, from General Smith, at dark on the 31st, that this division, under Whiting, had been ordered from the left wing of the army to the point designated on the Nine Miles road, just within the Confederate picket lines, to act as a supporting force; and was not ordered, or expected to attack unless the right wing failed to overpower the Federal corps, isolated at Seven Pines; or, unless the Federals sent reënforcements from the north bank of the Chickahominy.

Mr. Davis says the enemy on the Nine Miles road “had fallen back behind an open field to the bank of the river,” when he and General Lee reached the left of our line. The position of the enemy north of Fair Oaks was in fact nearly two miles from the river. Before General Johnston was wounded he had sent instructions 
to General Smith directing that all the available troops should be brought up as rapidly as possible. General Johnston's order was at once transmitted to the commanders of the only two brigades within reach that had not already been brought up, and the action north of Fair Oaks continued until dark. It is not considered necessary to comment upon the extraordinary efforts President Davis says he made to achieve victory, with a single brigade, by taking personal command on the field—or to say anything about the reasons he assigns for the failure of his special effort.

When the order was given, in the afternoon of the 30th, for the right wing of the Confederate army to attack the enemy at Seven Pines, it had not commenced to rain. At that time the cover in front of the lines of the enemy in the vicinity of Seven Pines was unfinished—Kearney's division was near Bottom's Bridge—Hooker's at White Oak Bridge—and both of these divisions had orders to march, on the morning of the 31st, to support the Fourth Corps at Seven Pines.* “The crossings of the Chickahominy at the Upper Trestle and New Bridges were favorable for artillery, cavalry, and infantry on the morning of June 1st, and the railroad bridge remained intact during the storm and freshet.” In view of these facts it is not necessary to comment on Mr. Davis's assertion that, “as we had permitted the enemy to fortify before our attack, it would have been better to have waited another day.”

In describing what occurred on the Williamsburg road. Mr. Davis, after quoting General Longstreet's report, showing that the forward movement began about 2 P.M., and the entire division of D. H. Hill became engaged 

* “The Battle of Fair Oaks,” by General G. W. Mindil.


about 3 P.M., and drove the enemy steadily back, asks: “Why did not our troops on the left during this long delay, as well as during the period occupied by Hill's assault, co-operate in the attack? and why, the battle having been preconceived, were they so far removed as not to hear the first guns?” Mr. Davis knew from General Smith, at dark on the 31st, that at sunrise General Johnston had intended, and expected, that Longstreet's division would be moved promptly into action by the Nine Miles road—D. H. Hill's by the Williamsburg road, and Huger's on Hill's right—as early as possible in the morning. General Johnston believed that the thirty thousand men in the right wing of his army, under Longstreet, would be able to crush the enemy at Seven Pines. But, to guard against contingencies, as previously stated, he ordered ten thousand men from the left wing of his army to move to the right, and take position just within the Confederate picket line; and he held them there as a supporting force. To have moved them any farther to the front, before knowing that the right was in close action and needed help, would have brought the supporting force at once in contact with the enemy, changed Johnston's plan entirely, and would have left no force to oppose reënforcements the enemy might send from the north bank of the river. Hill's division became engaged at 3 P.M.—at 4 P.M. General Johnston received General Longstreet's note calling urgently for immediate help—the supporting division was at once moved very hurriedly forward to Longstreet's aid. All this Mr. Davis knew; but, he does not ask why Longstreet's division was transferred from the Nine Miles road to the Williamsburg road, or why the fighting on the latter road was left almost exclusively to Hill's division.
General Johnston did not need the testimony of Federal officers to convince him that the force of the enemy isolated at Seven Pines could be crushed or put to flight early in the morning of the 31st, before it could be reënforced. He assigned this task to the right wing of his army. If the whole of this wing had been brought into action, as he intended, early in the morning, or even after 3 P.M., when Longstreet's division had been placed on the Williamsburg road, there would have been no pretext for asking why the supporting force was not moved forward sooner, or why it was not held nearer before the action commenced.

In commenting on the ex-President's account of the battle of the 31st of May it is only necessary to add: he is entirely in error when he asserts that “General Lee at night-fall gave instructions to General Smith, the senior officer on that part of the field.” General Smith was at that time in command of the army, General Lee gave him no instructions or suggestions.


CHAPTER VII.

Operations on the 1st of June. General Longstreet directed to renew the fighting—notes calling for help—five thousand men sent to him from the crest of the Chickahominy Bluffs—General Lee assigned to the command of the army—position held by Smith's division under Whiting ten days after the battle.

One of the parties sent by General Smith to communicate with General Longstreet, succeeded in finding him about midnight. Soon after General Smith's note of 12.40 A.M. was written, General Longstreet, without 
having received it, arrived at General Smith's headquarters. He reported that only a portion of his own division had been seriously engaged in close action, and that Huger's division had scarcely been engaged at all; the principal fighting had been done by D. H. Hill's division. The enemy's works at Seven Pines had been carried late in the afternoon—their troops had been pressed back about a mile beyond that point—and the fighting had continued until dark.

General Smith then directed General Longstreet to send one brigade of Huger's division to support the troops on the Nine Miles road—and renew the fighting with the remainder of the right wing as early as possible after daylight—directing his efforts north, instead of any farther east—pivoting this movement on Whiting's position. General Longstreet was assured that when a determined attack by the right wing was well developed, it should be favored by a strong demonstration—and, if necessary, by a real attack—made by the division under Whiting and other troops brought up by the Nine Miles road.

After General Longstreet left General Smith's headquarters to carry out these instructions, the latter wrote to General Lee telling him what had been determined upon, and what orders had been given. The following is General Lee's reply:

“Richmond, 1st June, 1862.

5 A.M.

“General:

“Your letter of this morning just received. Ripley will be ordered and such forces from General Holmes as can be got up will be sent. Your movements are judicious and determination to strike the enemy right. Try and ascertain his position and how he can best be hit. 

I will send such Engineers as I can raise. But with Stevens, Whiting, Alexander, etc., what can I give you like them. You are right in calling upon me for what you want. I wish I could do more. It will be a glorious thing if you can gain a complete victory. Our success on the whole yesterday was good, but not complete.

“Truly, R. E. Lee, General.

“Genl. G. W. Smith, Comdg. Army of N. Va.”

Whiting, Magruder, and A. P. Hill were notified of the contemplated movements; and some changes of troops were ordered to be made at once. Magruder was directed to place Cobb's brigade and Kershaw's nearer to New Bridge, and hold them in readiness to move at the shortest notice to replace the troops at that point and along that road so the latter could promptly reënforce Whiting. A. P. Hill was directed to hold his division ready to march, leaving a small guard at Meadow Bridges. D. R. Jones was directed to look after the crest of the Chickahominy Bluff, from Meadow Bridges to the vicinity of New Bridge, in case the contemplated movement of A. P. Hill's and Magruder's troops was carried into effect.

Soon after daylight brisk firing commenced some distance to the right and front of Whiting. In a short time it ceased. About six o'clock A.M. Whiting wrote: “They are advancing a battery of six pieces beyond the wheat-field of yesterday evening's fight—in front of where we stood last night. Hood is back in the woods extending to the railroad in a swamp. My brigade partly in those woods and partly in the large woods to the left of the field. . . It is very difficult to make an effective disposition—that is, so the troops can be handled well—and you know that four of my brigades 
are without their commanders.” At half-past six o'clock A. M. Whiting reported: “We will have to attack the position we tested last night, and that I own I don't like. Besides, it is just what the enemy wants. Heavy firing in advance of us and on the right.”

It now seemed that the right wing, under Longstreet, was beginning the movement ordered. In reply to General Whiting's two notes General Smith wrote: “I fully appreciate your want of brigade commanders, and, if your force is increased by fresh troops, will have to send with them an officer of rank who will relieve you of a portion of your onerous duties.” Major-General McLaws was the “officer of rank” referred to. General Smith intended, as soon as Longstreet's attack was fully developed, to place the brigades of Griffith and Semmes in line with Whiting's and Hood's at Fair Oaks—put McLaws in command of these four brigades—place Hampton's, Hatton's, and Pettigrew's brigades in second line, take immediate command of them—and control, in person, the movements of both lines until A. P. Hill could reach the field.

About this time, Major Jasper Whiting, who was watching the enemy on the north bank of the Chickahominy, reported the movement of troops and batteries passing down that bank. Soon after this General Whiting wrote: “I am going to try a diversion for Longstreet, and have found as reported, a position for artillery. The enemy are in full view and in heavy masses. . . . I have ordered up Lee with four pieces. The musketry firing in advance is tremendous.” On the far side of the gap, previously referred to, between Whiting's right and Longstreet's left, our troops were falling back. The firing had been, at times, quite heavy; but, there was nothing observed, from the Nine Miles road, indicating that any large portion of the right wing had begun, in earnest, the movement in which Whiting was ordered to co-operate.

The first information from General Longstreet was received about half-past eight A.M.: his note was dated eight o'clock. He said: “Major: Yours of six received. I have ordered a brigade of General Huger's, as agreed upon, to the support of General Whiting. Please send a guide for it.” About nine A.M. General Whiting reported: “The enemy are in very heavy force and bringing up artillery. If I don't receive an answer in half an hour I shall commence withdrawing my force. The position is bad—a line extended, and thin, and weak, over a mile or two in length, with no means of intercommunication.” A few minutes later, Whiting wrote: “Some of Griffith's regiments might be sent down to the railroad in rear of the position occupied by Hood, which, with a heavy enemy's battery directly in his rear, has become untenable.”

Major Jasper Whiting's reports continued to indicate some movement of the enemy, on the north bank, down the river. On our side they were penetrating the gap between Longstreet and Whiting. The latter was ordered to throw back his right, and take position a little nearer to the New Bridge fork of the Nine Miles road; and try to establish, and keep up, some sort of communication with Longstreet's left. At half-past ten A.M. General Smith wrote to General Longstreet: “The enemy are; from all accounts, crossing the river and concentrating below upon this side. I have as yet heard nothing of Ripley's brigade or of that from Huger's division. Ask Stuart if he cannot devise means for keeping your left and Whiting's right in communication with each other, I have directed Whiting 
to take closer defensive relations with Magruder's troops. . . . At any rate, that was absolutely necessary to enable a good defence to be made whilst you are pivoting on Whiting's position.”

Before this note of 10.30 A.M. was dispatched the following was received from General Longstreet: “The brigade cannot be spared. Every man except a brigade is in action. As you are not fighting, I did not send it, nor can I spare it. If I find myself at any time so that I can spare it, I will send it. But I am not able to do without it.” About the same time the following—from General Longstreet addressed to the Adjutant-General—was handed to General Smith: “Major: Yours of to-day received. The entire army seems to be opposed to me. I trust that some diversion may be made in my favor during these successive attacks, else my troops cannot stand it. The ammunition gives out too readily.”

At this time, General Smith was about half a mile east of the New Bridge fork of the Nine Miles road in consultation with General McLaws, General Whiting, and the Chief Engineer of the Army, Major Stevens. The latter had just returned from a reconnaissance in front of Whiting's command. He reported that the position held by the enemy north of Fair Oaks, the previous evening, was a good one for defence; that it had been fortified during the night, and was occupied by a strong force of infantry and artillery. During this conference, and but a few minutes after the foregoing notes from General Longstreet were read, the following was received from him:

“Headquarters, 10 A. M., June 1st.

“General:

“Can you reënforce me? The entire army seems to be opposed to me. We cannot hold out unless we get help. If we can fight together we can finish the work to-day, and Mac's time will be up. If I can't get help I fear I must fall back.

J. Longstreet.”

Longstreet's left, certainly, had already fallen back, and the enemy had got into position on Whiting's right and rear an hour before. If Longstreet fell back but a little farther, the right of Whiting's new line would be turned. In view of the Chief Engineer's report it was inexpedient for Whiting's command to attack again the position it had failed to carry the previous afternoon. The rapidly repeated demands made for help, by Longstreet, were so urgent, that it seemed the engagement of the right wing with the enemy that morning had been far more serious than was indicated by anything observed from the Nine Miles road.

General Smith ordered about five thousand men from the crest of the Chickahominy Bluff to move rapidly to Longstreet's assistance; and Ripley's brigade, which was expected to arrive by the Nine Miles road, was ordered to move as fast as possible by the Williamsburg road as soon as it reached Richmond. General McLaws was sent to Longstreet to inform him of the reënforcements ordered, assure him that the whole army of the enemy was not in his front, and tell him that he must not fall back any farther—but, drive the enemy and, if possible, regain the ground he had lost.

About one o'clock P.M. General Smith received a note from General McLaws stating: “Longstreet says he can hold his position with five thousand more men. He has now the same ground the enemy held yesterday.” About the same time the following note was received by General Smith from General Lee:

“Headquarters, Richmond, 1st June, 1862.

“General G. W. Smith,

“Commanding Army of Northern Virginia.

“General:

“The communication with the right wing of your army, as long as it is in the position in which I left it last evening, can be conveniently maintained by means of the York River and Richmond R. R. Cars will be put on the railroad, if you desire it, with orders to go to such point as you may direct.

“Very respectfully, “Your obedient servant, “R. E. Lee.”

By the expression “right wing of your army” General Lee evidently means the forces engaged the previous day—viz., the right wing and the supporting division which had been ordered to the right from the left.

General Lee assigned to the command of the army.—About 1.30 P.M. President Davis rode up to General Smith's headquarters, and asked for General Lee. Upon being told that General Lee was not there, he expressed so much surprise, that General Smith asked him if he had any special reason for supposing General Lee would be there at that time. To this he replied, Yes; and added, he had, early that morning, ordered General Lee to take command of the army at once. To this General Smith answered: Ah! in that case he will probably soon be here; requested the President to take a seat, and await the appearance of General Lee. The President 
chatted upon a variety of commonplace subjects; but made no allusion to anything pertaining to the state of affairs on the field.

General Lee came in, about two o'clock P.M., and General Smith at once turned over to him the command of the Army of Northern Virginia, and commenced explaining to him what had occurred during the day. To these explanations Mr. Davis seemed to give some attention: particularly to General Longstreet's notes asking for help. Whilst General Smith was still speaking, to General Lee, of the state of affairs upon the field of battle, the following communication was received from General Longstreet:

“Headquarters, June 1st, 1862. “1.30 P.M.

“General:

“I have just received a note from Major Melton. I will give instructions to General Hill to extend his line of skirmishers to the railroad. The next attack will be from Sumner's division. I think that if we can whip it we shall be comparatively safe from the advance of McClellan's army. I hope that those who were whipped yesterday will not appear again. The attack this morning was made at an unfortunate time. We had but little ammunition, but we have since replenished our supply, and I sincerely hope that we may succeed against them in their next effort. Oh that I had ten thousand men more!

“Most respectfully, “J. Longstreet, Maj.-Gen. Comdg.

“Our line is already connected, General Stuart says, by Cavalry Videttes. J. L.”

After reading the above note General Smith handed it to General Lee; and requested him to read, and hand it to the President. General Lee looked very serious whilst reading, and when the President read it he seemed to take a little more interest in what was going on; but said nothing. General Smith, still addressing General Lee, informed him that Longstreet was mistaken in regard to the state of things. That the two corps of the enemy on the north bank of the river, that morning, had not yet crossed to our side; that the force attacked north of Fair Oaks, the previous afternoon, still held that position; that 5,000 men, ordered from the crest of the Chickahominy Bluffs; were already closely approaching Longstreet's position on the Williamsburg road; that Ripley's brigade, which was expected, was ordered to move on the same road—that this would still leave Longstreet more than 30,000 men, even if his losses had already reached 5000—that the ground he now occupied was favorable to us—and that the danger to Richmond, if any, was not then on the Williamsburg road.

About three P.M. the President rode off, leaving General Lee and General Smith in conference, alone. General Lee made no adverse comment upon General Smith's management of the army—gave no orders—and at four P.M. he and General Smith, with a courier as a guide, went over to the Williamsburg road; where they found the President, and several members of his cabinet, talking with General Longstreet. They were at a point about half a mile west of the unfinished pentangular redoubt where our troops first struck the enemy's main line the previous day. Everything was quiet—the reënforcements from the Chickahominy had arrived.

In about an hour the President and members of his cabinet started for Richmond. General Lee and General Smith 

accompanied them about two miles on the Williamsburg road; and then, leaving the party, crossed over to the Nine Miles road in the direction of General Lee's headquarters on that road, which were two or three miles nearer Richmond than the headquarters at which the President found General Smith that afternoon. The battle was over.

General Lee gave no orders to General Smith on the 1st of June. Smith's division, under Whiting, continued to occupy the position it held during the night of the 31st; except the right had been withdrawn slightly, in the morning of the 1st, in order to prevent being turned by the enemy who were following Longstreet's retiring forces; and this necessitated a new alignment, in better defensive relations with Magruder's troops, in advance of the New Bridge fork of the Nine Miles road. General Smith is not aware that General Lee gave any orders to General Longstreet that afternoon. If he gave authority for the right wing to retire farther toward Richmond, it was not because of any pressure from the enemy, but must have been merely to get the troops out of the swamps and place them upon more comfortable ground.

The following extracts from a letter addressed by General Whiting to the Adjutant-General, of General Smith's proper command at that time, shows the position of “Smith's division,” under Whiting, for some ten days after the battle.

“Headquarters, 1st Division, 1st Corps, June 10, 1862. “Major:

“The attention of the General commanding the army should be called, at once, to the condition of this division. Its effective strength is daily decreasing.  Since Yorktown, with the exception of some four days during which it was encamped near Richmond, it has been constantly in contact with the enemy. It has fought two battles, the last an engagement of great severity, in which it suffered heavy loss, especially in officers; followed by two days of great hardship and privation. It now occupies an important position, where the service is exceedingly onerous, directly in the face of the enemy, with whom they are constantly engaged. They are in a swamp of an exceedingly unhealthy character, and to properly defend our centre, the labor is exhausting. . . . It is absolutely necessary that other troops relieve the 1st division. If no other offers, the 2d division (that of A. P. Hill) might take its place. The Major-General, no doubt, is well aware of the condition of affairs, and although not now on duty, I appeal to his influence if it can be exerted. A copy of this is sent direct to the General commanding the army.”

In the letter from Colonel Frobel, to General Smith, previously referred to, it is stated that: “At daylight on Sunday morning, June the 1st, heavy firing began on Hood's right. Hood occupied the same position he had during the night, while the left of Whiting's brigade was advanced so as to form with Hood's line an obtuse angle. The firing on the right was very heavy, both musketry and artillery, and lasted several hours. We remained in the position indicated, but not engaged, until the afternoon, when the brigades were withdrawn a short distance (some three or four hundred yards) to the shelter of heavy woods in our rear. I do not think after this that we changed our position for several days.”

General C. M. Wilcox, in a letter to General Smith, already quoted from, says: “Next morning (June 1st) 
the first shots heard were north of the two houses, a little west. We soon formed in line parallel with the Williamsburg road, and facing north; Pryor on the left; soon became engaged for twenty minutes or more. Ordered by D. H. Hill to withdraw, did so; and formed on the right of the Williamsburg road at Seven Pines, facing east. Four or five other brigades were there also in line. After dark all on Williamsburg road withdrew. My brigade slept from two A.M. till daylight near the forks of Charles City and Williamsburg roads; then moved to their previous camp.”


CHAPTER VIII.

General Mindil's account of Federal operations on the 1st of June. Statement made by Mr. Swinton. Ex-President Davis's account of operations on the 1st of June—Author's comments.

General Mindil says:* “On the extreme right, facing west-northwest, partly in open ground and partly in the woods facing Dr. Courtney's farm, and near the Adams house, was General Sedgwick's division of three brigades, the three regiments of Couch, already mentioned, and five batteries of artillery. While farther to the left, at an angle, and parallel with the railroad, and near Fair Oaks station, the division of General Richardson, which had arrived about midnight, was formed in three lines of a brigade front each—one battery of artillery on the right of the first line, the remaining three batteries of the division in reserve; then in Hyer's clearing, behind the railroad and facing south, the 7th 

* The Battle of Fair Oaks,” by G. W. Mindil, p. 10.

Massachusetts and 3d and 4th Maine regiments of Birney's brigade; the 38th and 40th New York regiments of the same brigade were in position to the south of the railroad, in the edge of the woods directly west of the Allen farm. Farther to the left, but somewhat in rear, covering the large open field between the railroad and Williamsburg road, was Hooker's division, ready and eager for battle; the line to the south of the Williamsburg road, ‘the third line of defence,’ being held by Kearney's division and the two divisions of the Fourth Corps. A numerous artillery, over sixty pieces, defending them. . . . Sumner's line had been reënforced to double its numbers, and every practicable approach to it was commanded by a numerous artillery. The troops were partially protected, a line of rifle-pits having been thrown up during the night. . . . About five o'clock on Sunday morning, in the gray of dawn, the Confederate skirmishers in front of Richardson opened fire. French's brigade with a regiment of Howard's, at once crossed to the south of the railroad, in readiness for the expected attack. Hazard's battery of the 4th Artillery (6 10-pound Parrot rifle guns) being posted on the right to command the large open field in that direction. Howard's brigade was in a second line while Meagher's Irish regiments, with eighteen pieces of artillery, occupied the third, or reserve line. A slight attempt on the part of the Confederates to cross the open field with a heavy skirmish line and some regiments of cavalry was checked by Hazard's guns. At half-past six o'clock a determined assault was made against General French's line, the enemy pushing forward, along the two wood roads that crossed the line, heavy columns of attack—supporting them on both flanks by battalions of infantry in deployed line. The firing 
commenced within half-musket-shot, and was maintained at close quarters for nearly an hour and a half before the enemy's column wavered and broke. French's men having exhausted their ammunition—sixty rounds per man—were relieved to enable them to refill their cartridge-boxes, Howard's five regiments taking their places. Hardly had this been done, when the enemy's column, strongly reënforced, gave a general yell, and again dashed forward to the attack. This renewed fight was of the most desperate and sanguinary character, lasting more than an hour, when the enemy were again driven back, without gaining a single point of the Union Line—their retreat being more precipitate than before, a rapid artillery fire accelerating their flight. So fierce was the fighting in Richardson's front, that he sustained a loss of nearly 800 men, in a division much smaller in numbers than Sedgwick's. . . . This desperate encounter was but a part of Sunday's battle, for when the firing first became heavy on the right, General Heintzelman sprang to Sumner's aid. ‘At half-past seven on Sunday morning, when the firing became heavy on the right,’ says General Heintzelman, ‘I sent forward one brigade and two regiments under General Hooker, and on the right General Birney's brigade, under the command of Colonel Ward.’ The 5th and 6th New Jersey regiments under General Hooker, moving through the woods towards Allen's farm and the railroad, soon joined the left of Ward's command, when, with the 38th and 40th New York regiments, the move was continued through the timber, the enemy falling back before this determined advance. As Hooker neared the clearing on Hyer's farm, he ordered his four regiments to charge; this cleared the woods, and the enemy were entirely broken, when they were met in the open ground by the destructive flank 
fire of three regiments posted behind the railroad. Hooker was now on the right flank and rear of the forces engaged with Richardson, and he was not slow to improve his opportunity. While this was transpiring along the railroad, General Sickles with the Excelsior brigade of five regiments, moved out the Williamsburg road about a mile, and when nearly opposite the two houses in front of which Colonel Poe fought so well the preceding evening, he changed the head of his column to the left, and brought it on the right by file into line. As soon as line was formed, his troops opened fire and advanced. In the woods the battle raged quite heavily for a few minutes, but Sickles gradually gained ground to the front. He certainly advanced to fight, and that his brigade was not more seriously engaged, as were the troops farther to the right, was no fault of his, the enemy yielding after slight resistance the ground along the Williamsburg road. Sickles soon joined Hooker, and in union with Richardson a general advance was made. No serious opposition was encountered, and Casey's camp was reoccupied before two o'clock P.M. “the ground being covered with the rebel dead and wounded as well as our own.’ . . . From the files of the War Department we gather the following statement of losses on Sunday, June 1st. In Richardson's division, three brigades, 765; in Birney's, four regiments, 196; in General Hooker's, seven regiments engaged, 313; a total of 1276. The enemy's loss must have been nearly double, and for the reason that he assaulted Richardson's command, no less than three times with heavy masses; and in front of Hooker's, his loss was at least equal.”

That there was some very heavy firing between a portion of Longstreet's command and the Federal forces, for several hours, there can be no doubt, but the contest 
made by the right wing of the Confederate army on the 1st of June was not of the character contemplated in General Smith's order. General Longstreet says the ammunition gave out too rapidly. The right wing withdrew from the position it occupied during the night of the 31st, instead of pushing its success of the previous day—making a real combined attack—fighting north—pivoting the movement on the position of General Whiting.

Mr. Swinton, in his “History of the Army of the Potomac,” after stating the number of killed and wounded, in the two days’ fighting, says: “A severer loss befell the Confederates than is expressed even in this heavy aggregate; for the able chief of the Army of Northern Virginia was struck down with a severe hurt. The command, for the time being, devolved upon General G. W. Smith, but the failure to make good the purpose of the attack, the heavy loss already suffered, and the disabling of General Johnston, determined General Smith to retire his forces. Preparations for withdrawal were actively pushed forward during the night; but through some accidental circumstances, a portion of Sumner's line having become engaged on the morning of the 1st of June, there ensued a recontre of some severity, which lasted for two or three hours. It ended, however, after some brisk sallies, in the withdrawal of the entire Confederate force to the lines around Richmond. . . . General Johnston has frequently expressed to the writer his amazement at the swelling bulk assumed by the ‘skirmish’ of the 1st. Though not present, having been removed to Richmond after his hurt, General Johnston yet knew by constant reports from the field, what was going on, and asserts that nothing more severe than an affair of the rear-guard took place. In his official 
report General Johnston simply says: ‘Major-General Smith was prevented from resuming his attack on the enemy's position next morning by the discovery of strong intrenchments not seen on the previous evening. On the morning of June 1st the enemy attacked the brigade of General Pickett, which was supported by that of General Pryor. The attack was vigorously repelled by these two brigades, the brunt of the fight falling on General Pickett. This was the last demonstration made by the enemy. In the evening our troops quietly returned to their own camps.’ ”

In view of established facts, already related, it is not worth while to make any comment upon these extracts from Mr. Swinton's History.

Ex-President Davis's Account of Operations on the 1st of June.—“When riding from the field of battle with General Robert E. Lee, on the previous evening, I informed him that he would be assigned to the command of the army, vice General Johnston, wounded, and that he could make his preparations as soon as he reached his quarters, as I should send the order to him as soon as I arrived at mine.”* “On the morning of June the 1st I rode out toward the position where General Smith had been left on the previous night, and where I learned from General Lee that he would remain. After turning into the Nine Mile road, and before reaching that position, I was hailed by General Whiting, who saw me at a distance and ran towards the road to stop me. He told me I was riding into the position of the enemy, who had advanced on the withdrawal of our troops, and there, pointing, he said, ‘is a battery which I am surprised has not fired upon you.’ 

* Rise and Fall, Vol. II. p. 130.

I asked where our troops were. He said his was the advance, and the others behind him. He also told me that General Smith was at the house which had been his (Whiting's) headquarters, and I rode there to see him. To relieve both him and General Lee from any embarrassment, I preferred to make the announcement of General Lee's assignment to command previous to his arrival. After General Lee arrived I took leave, and, being subsequently joined by him, we rode together to the Williamsburg road, where we found General Longstreet, his command being in front, and then engaged with the enemy on the field of the previous day's combat.”* “General Longstreet states that a serious attack was made on our position, and that it was repulsed. This refers to the works which Hill's division had captured the day before, and which the enemy endeavored to retake.”† “The operations of that day were neither extensive nor important, save in the collection of the arms acquired in the previous day's battle.”‡ “During the night our forces on the left had fallen back from their position at the close of the previous day's battle, but those on the right remained in the one they had gained, and some combats occurred there between the opposing forces.”§ “There have been various attempts made to point out the advantage which might have been obtained if General Lee, in succeeding to the command, had renewed on the 1st of June the unfinished battle of the 31st of May.”?

Comments.—Mr. Davis says he rode out in the morning. He reached General Smith's headquarters in the afternoon, having the previous evening ordered General Lee 

* Rise and Fall, Vol. II. p. 128.

† p. 127.

‡ p. 129.

§ p. 130.

? p. 155.


to take command of the army. The headquarters at which the President—after his, graphically described, perilous ride to the front—found General Smith, were two or three miles in advance of the place already selected by General Lee as his headquarters in the field. General Smith had never informed General Lee, or any one else, that he would remain in person at the point where he was when the President and General Lee left him the previous night. Mr. Davis knew that General Smith ordered General Longstreet to renew the attack early in the morning of that day; he saw the notes from General Longstreet written to General Smith during the morning, and that dated 1.30 P.M. ending with the exclamation, “Oh that I had ten thousand men more!” he knew that the division under Whiting bivouacked on the field of battle; and that late in the forenoon the right of this division had to be slightly thrown back, and the line otherwise adjusted, because the enemy in following Longstreet's withdrawing forces, were threatening the right flank and rear of Whiting's line; and he knew that on the 1st of June our troops on the right lost the ground they had gained on the 31st of May. In asserting that, on the 1st of June, General Lee accompanied him to the Williamsburg road, where they found General Longstreet, Mr. Davis makes another mistake.

In stating that, in the evening of the 31st, he ordered General Lee to take command of the army—then intimating that General Lee took command in the morning—and referring to “the advantage which might have been obtained if General Lee, in succeeding to the command, had renewed on the 1st of June the unfinished battle of the 31st of May”—Mr. Davis practically ignores the fact, well known to him, that General Lee did not take the command until about two o'clock in the afternoon. It is not deemed necessary to say here anything more about the ex-President's professed attempt to elucidate obscurity and correct error in regard to the operations on the 1st of June.


CHAPTER IX.


General J. E. Johnston's account of the battle of Seven Pines—Author's comments.

After stating that a reconnaissance made on the Williamsburg road on the morning of the 30th* under the direction of General D. H. Hill, encountered Federal outposts more than two miles west of Seven Pines, in such strength as indicated the presence of a corps at least, General Johnston proceeds to say: “This fact was reported to me by General Hill soon after noon. He was informed in reply that he would lead an attack upon this enemy next morning. An hour or two later, orders were given for the concentration of twenty-three of our twenty-seven brigades against McClellan's left wing. . . . Longstreet and Huger were directed to conduct their divisions to D. H. Hill's position as early as they could next morning; and Smith to march with his to the point of meeting of the New Bridge and Nine Miles road, near which Magruder had five brigades—Longstreet, as ranking officer of the three divisions to be united near Hill's camp, was instructed verbally to form his own and Hill's division in two lines crossing the 

* Johnston's Narrative, p. 132.

Williamsburg road at right angles, and to advance to the attack in that order; while Huger's division should march along the Charles City road by the right flank, to fall upon the enemy's left flank as soon as our troops became engaged with those in front. General Smith was to engage any troops that might cross the Chickahominy to assist Heintzelman's and Keyes's corps; or if none came, he was to fall upon the right flanks of those troops engaged with General Longstreet.”

Comments.—At the time General Johnston says he gave orders for concentrating more than five sixths of his army in the vicinity of Seven Pines, it had not commenced to rain. The crossings of the Chickahominy, by the fords and bridges, as far up as Meadow Bridges, were all in the hands of the enemy. The right of the Federal forces was at Mechanicsville, and three of the five corps of their army were known to be on the north bank of the river. The first duty of the Confederate army was to protect the city of Richmond, and it is hardly credible that General Johnston, early in the afternoon of the 30th, deliberately gave orders looking to the engagement of such a large proportion of his army against the comparatively small force of the enemy at Seven Pines, thus leaving the city open to attack by the mass of the Federal army crossing the river in his rear, anywhere between New Bridge and Meadow Bridges. Certainly, if such a movement against the enemy at Seven Pines was contemplated, the utmost celerity in its execution was imperatively demanded.

The records show that this extreme concentration of Confederates, in the vicinity of Seven Pines, was not ordered at all, much less, early in the afternoon of the 30th, before it commenced to rain. General Johnston entrusted the attack upon the Federal corps at Seven Pines to the right wing of his army. The only concentration of other troops was that directed by him at 9.15 P.M. on the 30th. In his written order, which has already been given in full, he says, in reference to G. W. Smith's division under Whiting: “Please be ready to move by the Nine Miles road—coming as early as possible to the point at which the road to New Bridge turns off. Should there be cause of haste, General McLaws, on your approach, will be ordered to leave his ground for you, that he may reënforce General Longstreet.”

McLaws's division was guarding the crossings of the Chickahominy from the Mechanicsville road to New Bridge, with one brigade and two regiments along the New Bridge road. The division under Whiting was on time, and McLaws's troops were not moved. General Johnston believed—with good reason—that the 30,000 men in the right wing of his army, under General Longstreet, were sufficient to crush the comparatively small portion of General McClellan's army in the vicinity of Seven Pines; and his main purpose in ordering the division under Whiting to move from the left wing of the army to the right, was to guard against reënforcements of the enemy from the north bank of the Chickahominy.

At 11 A.M. on the 31st, whilst McLaws's division was guarding the Chickahominy as already stated, and D. R. Jones's division was guarding the crossings at the Mechanicsville and Meadow Bridges roads; with A. P. Hill's division in supporting distance of Jones—General Johnston directed General G. W. Smith to take two brigades of the division, under Whiting, proceed to the crest of the Chickahominy Bluff between the Mechanicsville road and New Bridge, examine into the state of affairs, and, if necessary, remain there and take command of all the Confederate forces guarding the crossings of the river. These facts show, clearly enough, that General Johnston did not so far disregard the safety of Richmond, an hour or two after 12 M. on the 30th, as to order “the concentration of twenty-three of our twenty-seven brigades against McClellan's left wing.”

General Johnston's letter, to General G. W. Smith, dated June 28th, 1862; General Smith's official report, to General Johnston, dated June 23d, 1862; and the letter of Major Beckham, to General Smith, dated February 7th, 1863, all of which have been previously quoted from, show that, about sunrise on the morning of the 31st of May, General Johnston intended, and expected, that Longstreet's division would move into action early that morning, by the Nine Miles road. Until he saw General Johnston's published Narrative, General Smith never heard of the verbal instructions General Johnston says he gave General Longstreet to conduct his own division from the Nine Miles road to the Williamsburg road, and, “form his own and Hill's division in two lines crossing the Williamsburg road at right angles, and to advance to the attack in that order.”

There is nothing in General Johnston's order, of 9.15 P.M. on the 30th, indicating that, in any contingency, the division, under Whiting, was to make any “important flanking operation.” If General Johnson contemplated such a movement by this division, the fact that he was with it in person, and directed all its operations, from about sunrise until he was wounded just before sunset that day, must exonerate its commander, General Whiting, from all censure for not attacking “the right flanks of those troops engaged with Longstreet.”

In continuing his Narrative, General Johnston says:* “Being confident that Longstreet and Hill, with their forces united, would be successful in the earlier part of the action, . . . I left the immediate control on the Williamsburg road to them, under general instructions, and placed myself on the left, where I could soonest learn the approach of Federal reënforcements from beyond the Chickahominy. . . . An unexpected delay in the forward movement on the right disappointed me greatly, and led to interchanges of messages between Longstreet and myself for several hours. At three o'clock the Federal advance troops were encountered. They were a long line of skirmishers supported by five or six regiments of infantry covered by abattis. . . . The resolution of Garland's and George B. Anderson's brigades, that pressed forward on the left through an open field, under a destructive fire; the admirable service of Carter's and Bondurant's batteries, and a skilfully combined attack upon the Federal left, under General Hill's direction, by Rodes's brigade in front and that of Rains in flank, were finally successful, and the enemy abandoned their intrenchments. Just then reënforcements were received from their second line, and they turned to recover their lost position. But to no purpose—they were driven back, fighting, upon their second line—Couch's division at Seven Pines. R. H Anderson's brigade, transferred by Longstreet to the first line, after the capture of Casey's position, bore a prominent part in the last contest. Keyes's Corps, united in this second position, was assailed with such spirit by the Confederate troops that, although reënforced by Kearney's division of Heintzelman's corps, 

* Johnston's Narrative, p. 134.

it was broken, divided, and driven from its ground, the greater part along the Williamsburg road, to General Heintzelman's intrenched line, two miles from Bottom's Bridge, and two brigades to the southeast into White Oak Swamp. General Hill pursued the enemy toward Bottom's Bridge, more than a mile; then, night being near, he gathered his troops and re-formed them, facing to the east, as they had been fighting. The line thus formed crossed the Williamsburg road at right angles. The left, however, was thrown back to face Summer's corps at Fair Oaks. In an hour or two Longstreet's and Huger's divisions, whom it had not been necessary to bring into action, came into this line under General Longstreet's orders.”

Comments.—The first delay occurred, near General Johnston's headquarters in the suburbs of Richmond, a little after sunrise, caused by troops of Longstreet's division breaking up their camps and moving with their baggage trains across Whiting's line of march; thus preventing the head of his column from getting on to the Nine Miles road. About nine o'clock A.M. General Johnston first learned that Longstreet's division had been moved from the Nine Miles road—this information came from General Smith's Aide. General Johnston then sent his own Aide to General Longstreet directing that three brigades be sent back to the Nine Miles road if they had not gone so far that sending them back would cause a serious loss of time. General Johnston's Aide was captured and the message to General Longstreet was not delivered. At 11 A.M. General Johnston learned, through General Smith's Aide, that Longstreet's division, with its baggage train, was on the Williamsburg road, halted—waiting for D. H. Hill's division, which had just passed—and preparations were being made on the Williamsburg road to move forward to the attack. At 4 P.M. General Johnston learned through General Smith's Chief of Staff, that the troops on the Williamsburg road had been engaged for an hour or more and that General Longstreet was greatly disappointed because the troops on the Nine Miles road were not fighting—a few moments later, General Johnston received a note from General Longstreet urgently asking for immediate help; and about the same time heavy musketry firing, in the direction of Seven Pines, was first heard on the Nine Miles road.

Previous to the receipt of the note just referred to, General Johnston—although evidently much annoyed by the delay on the Williamsburg road, and apprehensive that time had been allowed for reënforcements from the direction of Bottom's Bridge to reach the enemy at Seven Pines—was still confident that the 30,000 men under Longstreet “would be successful.” But when General Johnston put the division, under Whiting, in motion he had reason to believe that Longstreet's whole forces were hardly equal to the task assigned them. In speaking of the successes of Hill's division aided by R. H. Anderson's brigade of Longstreet's division, and the position they occupied at dark, about a mile east of Seven Pines, General Johnston says: “In an hour or two Longstreet's and Huger's divisions, whom it had not been necessary to bring into action, came into the line under General Longstreet's orders.” He makes no mention of the note he received from Longstreet, at 4 P.M., asking for help: and no adverse comment on Longstreet's failure to put more than five of his thirteen brigades into the fight.

Continuing his narrative in reference to the operations of Smith's division, under Whiting, General Johnston 
says: * “When the action began on the right, the musketry was not heard at my position on the Nine Miles road, from the unfavorable condition of the air to sound. I supposed, therefore, that the fight had not begun and that we were having an artillery duel. However, a staff officer was sent to ascertain the fact. He returned at four o'clock with intelligence that our infantry as well as artillery had been engaged for an hour, and that our troops were pressing forward with vigor. As no approach of Federal troops from the other side of the Chickahominy had been discovered or was suspected, I hoped strongly that the bridges were impassable. It seemed to me idle, therefore, to keep General Smith longer out of action, for a contingency so remote as the coming of reënforcements from the Federal right. He was desired, therefore, to direct his division against the right flank of Longstreet's adversaries. I thought it prudent, however, to have Magruder's division in reserve. It was under arms near. General Smith moved promptly along the Nine Miles road. His leading regiment, the Sixth North Carolina, soon became engaged with the Federal skirmishers and their reserves, and in a few minutes drove them off entirely. On my way to Longstreet's left, to combine the action of the two bodies of Confederate troops, I passed the head of General Smith's column near Fair Oaks, and saw the camp of a body of infantry of the strength of three or four regiments, apparently, in the northern angle between the York River Railroad and the Nine Miles road, and the rear of a body of infantry moving in quick time from that point toward the Chickahominy by the road to the Grapevine Ford. A few minutes after this a 

* Johnson's Narrative, p. 136.

battery, at the point where this infantry had disappeared, opened its fire upon the head of the Confederate column. A regiment sent against it was received with a volley of musketry, as well as canister, and recoiled. The leading brigade, commanded by Colonel Law, then advanced, and so much strength was developed by the enemy that General Smith formed his other brigades and brought them into battle on the left of Law's. An obstinate contest began, and was maintained on equal terms, although the Confederates engaged superior numbers in a position of their own choosing. I had passed the railroad some little distance with Hood's brigade when the action commenced, and stopped to see its termination. But, being confident that the Federal troops opposing ours were those whose camps I had just seen, and therefore not more than a brigade, I did not doubt that General Smith was quite strong enough to cope with them. General Hood was desired to go forward, therefore, and, connecting his right with Longstreet's left, to fall upon the right flank of his enemy. The direction of the firing was then (near five o'clock) decidedly to the right of Seven Pines. It was probably at Casey's intrenched position. The firing at Fair Oaks soon increased and I rode back to that field—still unconvinced, however, that General Smith was fighting more than a brigade, and thinking it injudicious to engage Magruder's division yet, as it was the only reserve. While waiting the conclusion of this struggle, my intercourse with Longstreet was maintained through staff officers. The most favorable accounts of his progress were from time to time received from them. The contest on the left was maintained with equal determination by the two parties, each holding the ground on which it had begun to fight. This condition of affairs existed on the left at half-past six o'clock, and the firing on the right seemed then to be about Seven Pines. It was evident, therefore, that the battle would not be terminated that day. So I announced to my staff officers that each regiment must sleep where it might be standing when the contest ceased for the night, to be ready to renew it at dawn next morning. About seven o'clock I received a slight wound in the shoulder from a musket shot, and, a few moments after, was unhorsed by a heavy fragment of shell which struck my breast. Those around had me borne from the field. . . . The firing ceased, terminated by darkness only, before I had been carried a mile from the field. As next in rank, Major-General G. W. Smith succeeded to the command of the army. His division remained in the immediate presence of the enemy during the night, its right resting on the rail-road, where it joined Longstreet's left. Magruder's division was within supporting distance.”

Comments.—Magruder's division, referred to by General Johnston, was McLaws's division—a part of the centre of the army commanded by General Magruder. D. R. Jones's division was also a part of Magruder's regular command—but, several days before the battle of Seven Pines, when an attack upon the enemy north of the Chickahominy, in the direction of Mechanicsville, had been contemplated by General Johnston, he had placed D. R. Jones's division temporarily in the left wing, under the command of General G. W. Smith. The position occupied by McLaws's division has already been stated. It will be remembered that the left of this division was on the Mechanicsville road, nearly six miles, in an air line, from Fair Oaks station. Just before General Johnston was wounded, he sent a message to General Smith directing that all the available troops be 
brought up as soon as possible. General Smith sent this order direct to the only two brigades of Magruder's troops that were within reach. These brigades were in McLaws's division—they reached the field just before dark, too late to take any part in the action. After dark they were sent back; because, at the end of the action north of Fair Oaks the enemy were threatening our left flank on the immediate field, and the bringing up of Magruder's (McLaws's) two brigades had left a gap in our line from Fair Oaks to New Bridge.

General Johnston and General Whiting directed the movements against the enemy north of Fair Oaks until General Johnston was wounded. General Smith had no specific command on the field. At the time General Johnston sent instructions to have all the available troops brought up, the right of Whiting's line had been driven very hurriedly back toward the clump of trees at Fair Oaks where General Johnston then was. General Smith at once rode to the front where our left was closely engaged in the wood several hundred yards north of the Nine Miles road—and upon learning that the enemy were being rapidly reënforced on that part of the field, and that our troops had already suffered severely and were in danger of being crushed or routed—he ordered Hatton's brigade and Lightfoot's regiment of Pettigrew's brigade into close action—went with them to the extreme front, and remained there until the firing ceased at dark.

When General Smith went into the front line it was clear that the enemy had sent strong reënforcements from the north bank of the Chickahominy—how many had arrived, or how many more might be coming, was not known—but there were already enough engaged to make it very doubtful whether the four Confederate 
brigades on that part of the field could hold them back, and prevent them from reaching the left flank and rear of the troops in the Confederate right wing—which, judging from the character of Longstreet's note, received by General Johnston at 4 P.M., had, in their front, all they could successfully contend with.

Before reading General Johnston's Narrative General Smith never heard that during the engagement north of Fair Oaks General Johnston received most favorable accounts of General Longstreet's progress: nor that General Johnston, before he was wounded, had announced to his “staff officers that each regiment must sleep where it might be standing, when the contest ceased for the night, to be ready to renew it at dawn next morning.” At dark on the 31st there was a considerable gap—believed to be about a mile—between Longstreet's left and Whiting's right. It has already been stated that the left of what General Johnston calls “Magruder's division” was on the Mechanicsville road, about six miles from Fair Oaks, and the remainder of this division was guarding the crossings of the Chickahominy from that point to the New Bridge; with one brigade and two regiments on the line between the latter point and Whiting's left.

At the time General Johnston announced to his “staff officers that each regiment must sleep where it might be standing when the contest ceased for the night,” there was nothing in the situation decidedly favorable to the Confederate arms. On the morning of the 31st of May the Federals had, on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy, one corps at and near Seven Pines and another at Bottom's and White Oak Bridges. On the morning of the 1st of June they had three corps on the field of battle in the vicinity of Seven Pines. General Johnston 
had the initiative on the morning of the 31st, and the enemy did not expect to be attacked at that particular time. There was every reason for the belief that the Confederates would derive great advantage from an unexpected, sudden, and determined attack, in full force, upon a single Federal Corps, early in the morning of the 31st of May. But on the morning of the 1st of June, the three Federal Corps on the battle-field, fully aware of the immediate presence of the Confederates, were prepared for the attack.

General Johnston's account of what occurred on the 1st of June.—Continuing his narrative he says:* “Next morning, Brigadier-General Pickett, whose brigade was near the left of Longstreet's and Hill's line, learned that a strong body of Federal troops was before him and near. He moved forward and attacked it, driving it from that ground. Very soon, being reënforced apparently, the Federals (several brigades) assumed the offensive, and attacked him. In the mean time General Hill had sent two regiments of Colston's brigade to him. Although largely outnumbered, Pickett met this attack with great resolution, and after a brisk but short action repulsed the enemy, who disappeared, to molest him no more. I have seen no Confederate officer who was conscious of any other serious fighting, by the troops of those armies, on Sunday. . . . The loss in Longstreet's and Hill's divisions (in the two days) was about three thousand. . . . About five-sixths of the loss was in the latter division, upon which the weight of the fighting on the right fell.”

Comments.—In regard to what General Johnston says of the fighting that occurred on the 1st of June, 

* Johnston's Narrative, p. 139.

the reader is referred to General Longstreet's battle-field notes addressed to General Smith, and to General Mindil's account of the operations on that day. It is believed that there was a great deal more, and harder, fighting done on the 1st of June than is indicated in Johnston's Narrative, and not so much as might be inferred from Longstreet's notes.

But, without dwelling upon this point, attention will now be called to what General Johnston more than intimates ought to have been accomplished by the Confederates on the 1st of June. He says:* “The troops in position to renew the battle on Sunday were, at Fair Oaks, on the Federal side, two divisions and a brigade. . . . On the Confederate side, ten brigades in Smith's and Magruder's divisions, six of which were fresh, not having fired a shot. On the Williamsburg road four Federal divisions, three of which had fought and been thoroughly beaten—one, Casey's, almost destroyed. On the Confederate side, thirteen brigades, but five of which had been engaged on Saturday—when they defeated the three Federal divisions that were brought against them successively. After nightfall, Saturday, the two bodies of Federal troops were completely separated from the two corps of their right, beyond the Chickahominy, by the swollen stream, which had swept away their bridges; and Sumner's corps at Fair Oaks was six miles from those of Heintzelman and Keyes, which were near Bottom's Bridge; but the Confederate forces were united on the front and left flank of Sumner's corps. Such advantage of position and superiority of numbers would have enabled them to defeat that corps had the engagement been renewed on Sunday 

* Johnston's Narrative, p. 141.

morning, before any aid could have come from Heintzelman, after which his troops, in the condition to which the action of the day before had reduced them, could not have made effectual resistance. I was eager to fight on the 31st, from the belief that the flood in the Chickahominy would be at its height that day, and the two parts of the Federal Army completely separated by it; it was too soon, however. We should have gained the advantage fully by a day's delay. This would also have given us an accession of about eight thousand men that arrived from the south next morning, under Major-General Holmes and Brigadier-General Ripley. No action of the war has been so little understood as that of Seven Pines; the Southern people have felt no interest in it because, being unfinished in consequence of the disabling of the commander, they saw no advantage derived from it.”

Comments.—Before proceeding to show how greatly mistaken General Johnston is, in his statement of the positions occupied by the contending forces on the morning of the 1st of June, it is well to look at the evidence showing what did occur on that day. In General G. W. Smith's report, to General Johnston, dated June 23d, 1862, it is stated that, “General Longstreet was directed to push his successes of the previous day as far as practicable, pivoting his movement upon the position of General Whiting on his left. The latter was directed to make a diversion in favor of General Longstreet's real attack.”

The engagement was renewed on Sunday morning. On the Confederate side the battle-field notes of General Longstreet, already given, show that before 10 A. M. he wrote to General Smith: “The brigade cannot be spared, Every man except a brigade is in action.” 

About the same time he wrote to the Adjutant-General: “The entire army seems to be opposed to me. I trust that some diversion may be made in my favor during these successive attacks, else my troops cannot stand it. The ammunition gives out too readily.” At 10 A.M. he wrote to General Smith: “Can you reënforce me? The entire army seems to be opposed to me. We cannot hold out unless we get help.” And at 1.30 P. M.: “The next attack will be from Summer's division. I think that if we can whip it we shall be comparatively safe from the advance of McClellan's army.”

On the Federal side, General Mindil, as already stated, says: “In the gray of dawn the Confederate skirmishers in front of Richardson opened fire. . . . At half-past six o'clock a determined assault was made against General French's line. . . . The firing commenced within half-musket shot, and was maintained at close quarters for nearly an hour and a half before the enemy's column wavered and broke. . . . The enemy's column, strongly reënforced, gave a general yell and again dashed forward to the attack. This renewed fight was of the most desperate and sanguinary character, lasting more than an hour. . . . So fierece was the fighting in Richardson's front, that he sustained a loss of nearly 800 men. . . . This desperate encounter was but a part of Sunday's battle.”

At the time in question the centre of the Confederate army, under General Magruder, and the left, under General A. P. Hill, were substantially in the positions occupied before the order to attack was issued on the 30th of May. The connection between the division under Whiting near Fair Oaks and Magruder's right was very weak; and the enemy north of Fair Oaks had been specially pressing in that direction at dark on the 

31st. Between Whiting's right, which was on the railroad a little west of Fair Oaks station, and Longstreet's left—which it now appears was near the two wood roads leading to the railroad about a half mile east of that station, there was a gap of about three quarters of a mile. Longstreet's right was across the Williamsburg road a little east of the two houses marked on the map by two dots.

General Mindil says: Keyes's corps was in the “third line of defence,” about one mile and a half east of Seven Pines, the interval between Keyes's corps and Sumner's was held by the brigade of Birney, Hooker's division, and part of Kearney's; the troops were partially protected—a line of rifle-pits having been thrown up during the night, the pickets of the three corps thus disposed were in communication throughout. And he adds: “The crossings at the Upper Trestle and New Bridges were favorable for artillery, cavalry, and infantry, on the morning of June the 1st.”

It is not considered necessary to comment upon General Johnston's statement that he “was eager to fight on the 31st from the belief that the flood in the Chickahominy would be at its height that day;” or, say anything further in regard to his assertion that, “we should have gained the advantage fully by a day's delay.”

CHAPTER X.

General Taylor's statement. General Webb's account of the battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines—Author's comments. Letter from Major S. B. French. General remarks.

General Richard Taylor,* in speaking of the battle of Seven Pines, says: “General Johnston's ‘offensive’ must be limited to Seven Pines or Fair Oaks. Here his plan was well considered and singularly favored of fortune. Some two corps of McClellan's army were posted on the southwest or Richmond side of the Chickahominy, and a sudden rise of that stream swept away the bridges and overflowed the adjacent low lands, cutting off these corps from their supports. They ought to have been crushed, but Johnston fell severely wounded, upon which confusion ensued, and no results of importance were attained.”

This was written by General Taylor several years after General Johnston's Narrative was published. It is quoted here to show the effect of General Johnston's claim that the battle was “unfinished in consequence of the disabling of the commander.”

General Webb's account of the Battle of Seven Pines or Fair Oaks.—In the beginning of the preface to his work, entitled “The Peninsula,” General Webb says that, “To be of any practical use, all history, and particularly military history, must be gradually sifted and reduced to small compass.” He then proceeds to say that to his “task has been added the special work required in comparing and collating for careful investigation 

* “Destruction and Reconstruction,” by Richard Taylor.

the new material gathered by the War Department, and now for the first time made the basis of a history of that period.” He says that he has “been forced to choose between repeating the well-known accounts of various battles and giving from new data the proof.” And adds that he has “chosen the latter course.” In concluding his preface he says he is “under special obligations to Secretary of War Lincoln, to Secretary of the Navy Hunt, to Colonel Robert N. Scott, of the Bureau of Archives in the War Department, to Generals Wright, Meigs, Barnes, Humphreys, Keyes, and others for their kindness in furnishing maps and documents.” That he was “An actor himself in everything here treated of”—and on the title-page we find this work is “By Alexander S. Webb, LL.D., President of the College of the City of New York; Assistant Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac; Inspector-General, Fifth Army Corps; General commanding second division Second Corps; Major-General assigned, and Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac.”

He devotes a special chapter to, what he styles, “The first bloody and important contest of the campaign, known as the Battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines.” Amongst other things he says that early in the afternoon of the 30th, orders were promptly given by General Johnston,* “to concentrate twenty-three out of twenty-seven brigades of the Rebel army against the two Union corps, about two fifths of McClellan's army. . . . Longstreet and Huger were directed to move to D. H. Hill's position as early as possible next morning, and Smith to march, with his brigade, to the point of meeting of the New Bridge and Nine Miles roads, near 

* “Battle of Fair Oaks,” by Alexander S. Webb, p. 99.

which Magruder had five brigades. . . . General Smith was to engage reënforcements should any be sent across the Chickahominy; and in case he should encounter none, to attack on the left of the troops already engaged. Although the second in command, General Smith was not transferred to the point of first attack, lest the delay in moving his troops from the left, where they lay, should take up valuable time.” “But he went to that point and remained there.” “Their order of battle, it will be remembered, put G. W. Smith on the left, Johnston being with him, Longstreet and D. H. Hill in the centre, and Huger on the right, with orders to move on the left flank and rear of the Federals. Some recrimination was indulged in by the commanding officers on account of the delay on Longstreet's part in making the attack, and the alleged total failure of Huger to co-operate at all.”* “Huger seems to have defended himself successfully. As to Smith, on the other hand, a cause for the delay in his attack is found in a peculiar condition of the elements. . . . The wind proved an unreliable courier; it took up the sound of the cannon and carried that only to Johnston and Smith. It was not until Hill's movement resulted in a heavy engagement which had lasted for some hours that, about three o'clock P.M., Smith was informed of the state of affairs and pushed in on Couch's right, cutting the latter off from the remainder of his division. These mistakes on the part of the enemy saved us from a more serious disaster than we suffered.”† “The troops to whom this line (Sedgwick's division and five regiments of Couch's) was opposed during the latter part of the day were Hood's brigade, Whiting's, Pettigrew's, Hampton's, 

* “Battle of Fair Oaks,” by A. S. Webb, p. 108.

† p. 110.

and Hatton's.* . . . General Hampton reports that after driving the enemy a short distance through the woods, he found that they were being rapidly reënforced and held a strong position either fortified or affording natural shelter, and were fast extending beyond his (Hampton's) left. . . . General Smith expresses the rather sanguine opinion that if he could have had an hour more of daylight, with the assistance of Hood's brigade of Texans on the right, supported by Griffith's, of Mississippi, on the left, as well as by the brigade of General Semmes, all fresh troops, the enemy would have been driven into the swamps of the Chickahominy. . . . Three times, in his report of this day's action, General Smith speaks of the enemy's (Federal) strong position, as ‘either fortified or affording natural shelter;’ again, the ‘strong position of the enemy is better understood;’ again, ‘reconnoissance made during the morning developed the fact that the enemy (Federal) was strongly fortified in the position attacked by my division on the previous evening.’ There was no fortification, or the semblance of one, on any part of the line held by the fragment of Couch's division under General Abercrombie and the troops of Summer's corps as they arrived on the field in the afternoon. . . . The imaginary fortified position which Smith encountered was, in fact, the living wall of brave men who withstood his advance and compelled him finally to retreat. . . . The Second Mississippi, upon whom General Smith relied to take the enemy's (Federal) fortifications the next morning, were withdrawn before daylight.” “The attempt of the Rebels to drive the left wing into the Chickahominy, and cut McClellan's line of supply from White House, 

* “Battle of Fair Oaks,” by Alexander S. Webb, p. 112.

which opened with every prospect of success, was turned first into failure and then into disaster, which sent them back to Richmond in a panic on the night of June 1st. General Johnston, who refers in his report to the intrenchments which prevented General G. W. Smith from attacking the right of Sumner's line on June 1st, claims a victory on that day, when he was not on the field. . . . D. H. Hill, who led the advance on Casey's camp, claims to have driven the Union troops first a mile and a half, and subsequently a mile farther, meeting with a constant series of successes on May 31st and June the 1st, until by reason of the ‘Yankees’ occupying ground in his rear on the Nine Miles road (a strange place for a beaten army to be in) it was deemed best to withdraw to Richmond.”* General G. W. Smith “directed operations until June 2d, when General R. E. Lee was placed in command of the army of Northern Virginia.”†

On page 105 Gen. Webb says: “Sergeant Porter, left guide of the One Hundred and Fourth, was struck over the neck with a musket. . . . It was necessary to leave the guns, most of the horses having been killed, with the exception of a part of Regan's battery which was brought off, the men supporting the wounded horses to keep them from falling in the traces.” On page 102: “It is not often that within the stern brevity required by a military report, any allusion is made such as the fury of the storm drew from General Keyes, who in speaking of it says: ‘From their beds of mud and the pelting of this storm the Fourth Corps rose to fight the battle of the 31st of May.’ ” He adds: “Longstreet's division was called right wing at Seven Pines;”‡ informs his readers 

* “Battle of Fair Oaks,” by Alexander S. Webb, p. 116.

† p. 115.

‡ The Peninsula, p. 203.

that the story of this battle “is well known to all;”* and asserts that it has been discovered since the war the Federal army “could have gone to Richmond.”†

Comments.—The foregoing quotations, from General Webb's description of the battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines fairly illustrate the result of his labors in sifting new material and reducing the data to small compass. It is not proposed to follow him closely, upon the elevated plane which he professes to have occupied, whilst executing his assigned task of recording condensed truth in regard to the “first bloody and important contest” of the Peninsula campaign against Richmond.

In view of facts already stated no comment is needed here in reference to his assertion that Smith was ordered to march his brigade to the point of meeting and attack in case Federal reënforcements from the north bank of the Chickahominy were not encountered—that Smith relied upon the Second Mississippi regiment to take the Federal fortifications next morning—or his various other gross errors in regard to the part taken by General Smith in this action. But, it may well be said, General Webb's conclusion that disaster to the Confederates sent them back to Richmond in a panic on the night of the 1st of June is just as unfounded as his gratuitous postponement, to the 2d of June, of General Lee's assignment to the command of the army of Northern Virginia.

In his description of this battle General Webb appears to have blindly adopted many of the errors, in regard to Confederate movements, contained in the narratives which preceded his own, and to have introduced some new ones. On the other hand it must be conceded that, 

* The Peninsula, p. 186.

† p. 186.

in sifting new material, he reduces military history to small compass, for “practical use,” by saying: “Sergeant Porter (Federal), left guide of the One Hundred and Fourth, was struck over the neck with a musket.”

Without further reference to General Webb's account of this battle, attention is called to the following letter from Major Seth B. French, which was written to General Smith soon after the publication of Mr. Swinton's account of General Johnston's original plan of the battle of Seven Pines.

“Chattanooga, Tenn., July 8, 1867.

“My Dear General:

“In compliance with your request I have the pleasure of furnishing you, to the best of my recollection, with incidents and facts associated with movements made on the 31st of May, 1862—the battle of Seven Pines. On the morning of that day, under your orders, I, with other members of your staff, followed you to the headquarters of General Johnston, known as the Stubbs House, and there learned, as an officer of your staff, particulars of movements preparatory to an attack upon the enemy's forces on the south side of the Chickahominy. General Longstreet had been ordered to move his own division on the Nine Miles road; General D. H. Hill on the Williamsburg, and General Huger on the Charles City, three divisions, forming the right wing of the army, under the command of General Longstreet. General Whiting commanding your own proper division, had been ordered by General Johnston to move at an early hour to the Nine Miles road and act as a support to General Longstreet, who had been directed to engage the enemy. General Whiting with his command, within a short distance of General Johnston's headquarters, 
reported that his march was impeded by the movement of General Longstreet's troops across his line of march, and in the direction of the Williamsburg road. With this information, you ordered Colonel Beckham, then Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp, to go to General Longstreet and find out his exact position, and report to him the delay—in the movement of Whiting's command—caused by Longstreet's division crossing Whiting's line of march—and have it remedied. In about an hour after that a courier arrived from Lieutenant Beckham, stating that he could not find General Longstreet or his command, and was fully satisfied that neither he nor his division was on the Nine Miles road. General Johnston on receipt of this information—and being satisfied that Beckham must be mistaken—despatched his Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant Washington, in search of General Longstreet on the Nine Miles road, which resulted in the capture of Washington. Colonel Beckham, on his return to headquarters, reported that General Longstreet was on the Williamsburg road, and the troops he saw had halted, having with them their baggage wagons, etc. Some time after Beckham returned, you, with a selection of officers of your staff, moved under orders from General Johnston, to a point, and with an object, not known to me; leaving myself and a number of your officers to accompany General Johnston on the Nine Miles road. Which we did, and remained with him until you rejoined us about half a mile this side of the junction of the New Bridge and Nine Miles roads. At the house selected for headquarters much anxiety was manifested because of the unaccountable delay of General Longstreet in striking the enemy. General Johnston requested me to listen for musketry, and when I reported that I could not hear any, he said that he wished the troops were back in their camps. Subsequently information was received at headquarters that Longstreet had engaged the enemy. I cannot remember the hour when this information arrived, but am inclined to think it was after four o'clock in the afternoon when General Johnston left his headquarters and galloped down the Nine Miles road to the point where General Whiting was in command of your division. You followed soon after General Johnston. When I arrived on the field General Johnston was, in person, giving orders for the movement of the troops under General Whiting, and called upon different members of your staff to assist him, which they cheerfully did. I understood at the time of the fight, in fact prior to leaving General Johnston's headquarters (in the suburbs of Richmond), that you were on the field without an immediate command—though a portion of your troops under General Whiting were engaged—for the purpose of rendering any assistance occasion might demand, and watching the movements of the enemy. I do not remember now of your taking any active part in the affair until it was reported that General Hampton's command was in much peril, and unless assistance was rendered it would possibly be crushed. This aid you promptly rendered, so far as it was in your power, and in person went immediately to the scene of action. I saw very little of you after that during the engagement; but, was quite near General Johnston when he was wounded. Captain Fauntleroy, of General Johnston's staff, started off to inform you of the Commanding-General's wound, though I do not think he found you. When you returned to the Nine Miles road the firing had ceased, it was quite dark and rainy, and I am under the impression it was there that you first heard of they 
injury sustained by the General Commanding, who had retired from the field. I regret I cannot go more into detail.

“Most truly your friend, “S. B. French.”

General Johnston's letter to General Smith, dated the 28th of June, 1862, shows clearly that he intended Longstreet's division, or at least a large portion of it, should move into action by the Nine Miles road. It is quite certain that previous to the receipt of General Longstreet's note, at 4 P.M. on the 31st, General Johnston believed—and with good reason—that the thirty thousand men in the right wing of his army would be able to defeat the enemy in the vicinity of Seven Pines. He did not direct the division under Whiting to move from the left wing of the army to the right in order to attack the right flank of the enemy at Seven Pines in case it did not encounter Federal reënforcements from the north bank of the Chickahominy. In other words, no important flanking operation was entrusted to this division in General Johnston's original plan. But, when General Longstreet—within less than an hour after only one of the three divisions under his command was fully engaged—called upon General Johnston for immediate help, the latter moved the supporting division under Whiting, rapidly to Longstreet's assistance. Four brigades of that division encountered, and held at bay, Federal reënforcements from the north bank of the Chickahominy, whilst the other brigade was sent by General Johnston direct to Longstreet. It is believed that General Johnston is correct in saying that only five of the thirteen brigades under Longstreet were brought into action on the 31st, and that five sixths of the loss 
sustained by the right wing, in the two days’ fighting, was suffered by D. H. Hill's division.

All that is said and intimated by General Johnston, Mr. Davis and others, in reference to the advantage that might have been gained by the Confederates, if the unfinished battle of the 31st of May had been renewed early on the morning of the 1st of June, is sufficiently answered by the fact that the Federals had three corps on the battle-field on the 1st whilst they had only one on the morning of the 31st—and the Confederate force on that field on the first of June was the same as that ordered by General Johnston on the 30th of May. But, apart from this, General G. W. Smith, who assumed command at dark on the 31st, ordered the Confederate attack to be renewed as soon after daylight as practicable next morning. The result is indicated in General Longstreet's battle-field notes, ending with that of 1.30 P.M., in which he exclaims, “Oh that I had ten thousand men more!”